Russia: Borrowing from the Capitalists

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Far more at home with a balance sheet —or a Western businessman—than with the shadow-boxing of Leninist theology, Kosygin has long been the whiz kid of the Communist bureaucracy (at 44 he was the youngest member of the Politburo). Now 60, he probably understands the Soviet economy better than any man alive, and with his pragmatic, McNamaraish fetish for efficiency, took the part of the reformers even under Khrushchev. If any Communist leader can turn the experiments "into the law of the land, it is Kosygin. The cautious, rational, step-by-step method he has adopted in extending them is in itself an encouraging sign, points out U.S. Economist Marshall Goldman, who has made a careful study of the Soviet economic controversy. "They had to make changes," he adds. "If they had not, the economy would have gone straight down. It was really more a question of saving the economy than simply strengthening it."

If, under Kosygin, Evsei Liberman is at all surprised to find himself at .least nominally in the vanguard of modern Communism's potentially most far-reaching reform, he shows no sign of discomfort in the role. Although he retired formally two years ago, he still teaches three classes a week in the Kharkov University skyscraper overlooking Dzerzhinsky Square. When asked if he tries to inculcate his students with notions of profitability, he smiles and says, "Yes, but very carefully: I say that it is my opinion, but there are many objections. I explain them all, and the students draw their own conclusions."

"Stop—Go." Nor are his days of experiment at an end. Last month Liberman was in Lvov, explaining his theories to the Town Economic Council, which has been authorized to make the first area (as opposed to industry) test of the "profit incentive." Lvov is of particular interest because the five industries in the test include a coal mine and a mobile-hoist manufacturing plant —the reformers' first venture outside the confines of light industry. Liberman stoutly denies that Western capitalism has had any influence on his theories, and has referred to Western reporting of his work as "capitalistic" as the work of "the snipes in the swamp." But he plainly follows with careful interest what is written in the West about the great debate, promptly fires off tart letters to editors in excellent English if he has any quarrel with the interpretation.

Whatever the final outcome of the debate, the fact that it has taken place at all in such frankness and freedom is remarkable testimony to how far Russia has come since Stalin. Some Sovietologists think the enemies of the reform are simply biding their time, confident that sooner or later the experiments are bound to cause economic dislocation that will force a retrenchment. For the new system to really work, the Kremlin will have to eventually free prices. And then unemployment may result, which no Soviet regime is likely to tolerate. Goldman thinks that progress will likely be on a "stop-go" basis, a little at a time to permit the economy to adjust to the wrenching changes that the switch from a command economy will inevitably entail.