Nation: McNamara's Legacy

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Since he moved into the Pentagon's E Ring two months ago, Defense Secretary Clark Clifford has spent most of his working hours learning the intricacies of his new job and supervising a broad review of the nation's Viet Nam effort. Last week, in his first public address since he joined the Cabinet, Clifford sounded sanguine enough. "We concluded," he told the annual Associated Press luncheon in Manhattan, "that the increased effectiveness of the South Vietnamese government and its fighting forces will now permit us to level off our effort—and in due time to begin the gradual process of reduction."

"America is not in trouble," he declared. "I suggest that many present critics some day will applaud our stand in Southeast Asia."

Whether or not Clifford's optimism on Viet Nam proves to be justified, he faces another battle with even larger implications for the nation's security. From Robert McNamara, Clifford inherited responsibility for the nation's long-range defense planning, a process that must necessarily be programmed from five to ten years ahead. McNamara's legacy was an $80 billion 1969 budget and elaborate blueprints projecting the nation's defenses into the next decade.

Crippling Trend. McNamara's plans are destined to undergo considerable trimming in Congress, where presidential pleas for a tax increase have been countered by demands for $6 billion in spending cuts—half of which probably will come from next year's defense budget and from some $22 billion in procurement funds for the development and purchase of future weapons systems. The Senate has pared $660 million from the procurement bill, which faces additional surgery in the House.

Despite the parsimonious mood of Congress, McNamara is criticized for having failed to allot enough defense funds for long-range planning. For three years, the war has forced the Pentagon to skimp on research and development. Says John S. Foster Jr., 45, director of defense research and engineering: "If this trend were allowed to continue, our national technological position soon would be crippled."

As guardian of McNamara's legacy under Clifford, Foster must balance military and budgetary considerations in planning the nation's future defenses. Among the projects at issue:

> ADVANCED MANNED STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT. The Air Force, reluctant to rely entirely on missiles to penetrate Soviet and Chinese defenses, wants to start work on an AMSA fleet to replace the aging B-52s and B-58s. Foster favors the AMSA, but not immediately. He prefers to improve weapons and penetration devices on the older bombers.

> A NEW AND LARGER FORCE OF ICBMs. Air Force leaders want additional missiles to reinforce the present Minuteman series and ensure penetration of the new Soviet ABM defenses being installed around Moscow. Foster argues that the U.S. still has several hundred more ICBMs than the Soviets and is improving its silos, the better to withstand any Soviet first strike.