Nation: FIRST LESSONS OF THE WAR

WAR today is more than "policy by other means," as Von Clausewitz defined it in the 19th century. In the mid-20th century, when the realities of power are often obscured by fog banks of propaganda and U.N. debate, the outbreak of hostilities anywhere in the world urgently demands a return to the only meaningful diplomacy, which in the last analysis involves a bilateral dialogue between the nuclear giants, Moscow and Washington. The repercussions of the Middle East war may not be resolved for some time to come, but some of its major implications are already clear:

• The nuclear deterrent does deter. From the first click of the "hot line" to the last circumlocution in the U.N.Security Council at week's end, the two great powers carefully and repeatedly affirmed their determination to avert a big war and—despite the high economic and political stakes —to shut off the small one.

• The U.N. can only implement U.S.-Soviet policy. Indeed, until the point at which Washington and Moscow decide on a mutually advantageous course of action, the U.N. can even exacerbate a crisis, as it did by U Thant's precipitous withdrawal of the U.N. peace-keeping force from the Sinai Desert.

• The great powers can count on little but moral support—if that—from their lesser allies. The U.S. and Brit ain got nowhere in their attempt to open the Arab-blockaded Gulf of Aqaba with a concerted stand by a reputed 40 maritime powers. At the same time, Russia's Arab allies ran out of control and ended by dragging Moscow into defeat and disrepute in the Communist world from Peking to Havana.

• No amount of foreign hardware can make a military victor of a nation that lacks effective leadership and the will to win. With $2 billion in Russian weapons and a decade of training under Russian supervision, the Egyptian forces proved as inept at desert warfare as they had in the Sinai campaign of 1956.

• Despite the canard that the U.S. is preoccupied by Asia to the exclusion of world interests, Washington was ready to take considerable risk to aid its Israeli ally, and to stabilize an area whose oil reserves are far more vital to Europe than they are to America. By keeping its cool while implicitly supporting an ally, the U.S. also belied the myth, propagated by both Communists and some U.S. liberals, that the U.S. is aggressive, arrogant and trigger-happy.

• Russia's leaders, having opened up the widest credibility gap since their climb-down from the Cuban missile crisis, may be persuaded—for the time being at least—to refrain from further foreign adventures that so clearly imperil the world's peace.