The War: Thunder from a Distant Hill

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There is another side to that coin: while the credibility of U.S. power would be severely damaged by a hasty pullout, it is also bound to suffer in the long run if America's superiority proves to be incapable of destroying a largely guerrilla army. After all, as a German editor pointed out recently, the Wehrmacht went through Poland in six days. Yet, like the duel of the DMZ, the Viet Nam war has from the start been a grueling struggle of attrition—one that could go on for 15 years, according to a Pentagon-subsidized study.

However, as Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew pointed out last week, a poorly timed U.S. withdrawal would mean that "the mincing machine—terrorism, subversion, guerrilla insurrection"—would soon be at work throughout Asia. "I know enough about Southeast Asia," he said, "to know that the wrong kind of conclusion to the mess in Viet Nam can absolutely unscramble the whole lot of us."

To prevent this, Johnson needs some dramatic action to persuade a skeptical public of two things: the sincerity of his desire to end the war, and the necessity to continue it if peace eludes his reach. The bombing pause that he hinted at in his San Antonio speech could prove the answer. It would, however, entail military risks that should be understood. During this year's six-day pause for the Tet holiday, for example, the North Vietnamese stockpiled 25,000 tons of supplies north of the DMZ—and the Marines at Con Thien may still be suffering from Hanoi's New Year's resolve. If Johnson were to decide on a new bombing halt, it could embrace all of the North; but with Hanoi lobbing shells across the DMZ from positions above the 17th parallel, it would be more realistic to limit air strikes to the area south of Vinh near the 19th parallel. Most of the North's major population centers lie above that point and would thus be spared.

Hollywood Solution. Hanoi has repeatedly hinted that it would sit down and talk once the U.S. quit bombing the North. U.S. officials cannot help but wonder. Hanoi's tone is as belli cose as ever, and the North sounds almost as if it were believing its own propaganda that 100,000 U.S. troops have been killed (actual total: 13,000) and 2,300 planes downed (v. 800).

If the talks were begun in earnest, the U.S. would then confront the question of terms. Almost certainly, no settlement will be possible without U.S. acknowledgment that the Viet Cong's political arm, the National Liberation Front, must have a role in South Viet Nam's political life—after its members turn in their weapons. Some form of international inspection would be required to help prevent the ex-guerrillas from reverting to terrorist tactics in order to convert a coalition regime into an outright Communist government.

Any such solution entails obvious risks. So, for that matter, does an intensification of the war, or even its continuation along present lines. In any case, Johnson and his advisers regard withdrawal as unthinkable.

"Two things we must do," said the President at San Antonio. "Two things we shall do. First, we must not mislead our enemy. Let him not think that debate and dissent will produce wavering and withdrawal. For they won't. Let him not think that protests will produce surrender. Because they won't. Let him not think