The War: Thunder from a Distant Hill

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As the northwest corner of Leatherneck Square, Con Thien is well covered by U.S. guns. Approximately seven miles south of it lies Cam Lo at the southwest corner of the square. About the same distance east lies Gio Linh, at the northeast corner, with Dong Ha to its south. All four outposts, in addition to others farther south, notably Camp Carroll, can provide artillery support for one another or reinforcements if necessary.

"I can't envision," says a high-ranking Marine officer, "Con Thien's being overrun. It is a symbol in people's minds, but what we're talking about is the entire defense of the northern area. We are facing a major invasion. It's either fight it off or give up."

Barrier Post. Con Thien is also important because it is likely to be one of the posts along the barrier that Defense Secretary Robert McNamara said would be constructed south of the DMZ. Already it is the western terminus of a 600-yd.-wide swath that was bulldozed for eleven miles through the scrub brush and elephant grass earlier in the year to serve as a free-fire zone in which anything that moves is shot at. Though details of the new barrier remain secret, it is assumed that it will be an extension of the present line over to the Laotian border. Thus it probably will be necessary for the Marines to hold Con Thien until combat engineers complete the barrier and electronic devices, mines and barbed wire take over the surveillance role.

Crumbled Foxholes. Savage as it is, the potency of Communist firepower in the DMZ has been exaggerated—partly because casualties from artillery and every other cause have been lumped together by the military and reported as though they were all inflicted by the big guns. Of 158 Marines killed around Con Thien during the first 24 days of September, 44 died in artillery, rocket and mortar attacks, the rest in firefights with North Vietnamese infiltrators. One captured Communist reported that Red casualties were so heavy in the DMZ area that aid stations were overflowing.

When the northeast monsoon begins pelting Con Thien with 20 to 25 inches of rain a month, the Marines and the enemy will both have trouble preventing their sodden fortifications from crumbling. Within three days last month, 18 inches of rain poured down on Con Thien, caving in foxholes. Continuing rains and Communist pressure last week closed the resupply route from Cam Lo—at a time when most of the CH-46 choppers used to airlift material were grounded for defective tail assemblies. The low monsoon clouds will hinder U.S. air strikes, but the rain will also cause problems for the Communists. "We'll have a better opportunity to catch the enemy on higher ground, where he has to bring his weapons and be careful where he stores his ammo," says a Marine officer. "He'll have difficulty maintaining well-camouflaged and underground positions in the DMZ."

U.S. officers believe that the difficulty of supplying tons of munitions for their great guns has already limited the Communist artillery buildup. "Were it not for our air strikes on the lines of communication in North Viet Nam," says Westmoreland, "the number of artillery pieces north of Con Thien would be several-fold and the number