The War: Thunder from a Distant Hill

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overtones of Johnson's weary-preacher style. Written in close consultation with National Security Adviser Walt W. Rostow, the address explained that the U.S. was in Viet Nam not only because "we cherish freedom and self-determination for all people," but also to look after "our own security." Said Johnson: "I am convinced that by seeing this struggle through now, in Viet Nam, we are reducing the chances of a larger war—perhaps a nuclear war."

The President reiterated his desire to negotiate, but in the softest terms yet. He made no demand for a prior, specific quid pro quo from Hanoi. "The United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Viet Nam when this will lead promptly to productive discussion," he said. "We of course assume that while discussions proceed, North Viet Nam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation." For the first time, Johnson seemed to be wigwagging a readiness to stop the bombing and enter into talks without advance guarantees or gestures from Hanoi.

Whether the slight opening in Johnson's speech will be explored by Hanoi remains to be seen. However, a similar and only slightly less conciliatory phrase in Ambassador Arthur Goldberg's speech to the U.N. General Assembly two weeks ago was brusquely dismissed by Hanoi as "insolent and ridiculous."

Unfortunately, the President's critics are scarcely more helpful when it comes to offering alternatives to his policies. Few go so far as Novelist Mary McCarthy, who insists that it is the duty of the antiwar intellectuals not to suggest ways to get out of Viet Nam gracefully—just to keep pounding away at Johnson to get out, period. "How this should be done," she wrote in her frankly biased account, Vietnam, "ought not to be the concern of those who oppose our presence there." A far different approach was adopted by Novelist John Updike, in a letter to the New York Times last week. "Anyone not a rigorous pacifist," he wrote, "must at least consider the argument that this war, evil as it is, is the lesser of available evils, intended to forestall worse wars."

Whatever the degree of evil, Lyndon Johnson would unquestionably like to end it—if only to ease the enormous pressure on his Administration. Four broad routes are, and always have been, open to him:

∙DISENGAGEMENT. The most extreme move would be a precipitous pullout, which few besides those on the extremist fringe see as a possible solution. A more gradual form of disengagement would be to concentrate U.S. forces in coastal enclaves, as proposed by retired Lieut. General James Gavin. In effect, the enclave solution would amount to a phased withdrawal, leaving most of South Viet Nam to the mercy of the Communists.

∙DE-ESCALATION. The most modest proposals call for a pause in the bombing of the North and reduction of U.S. "search-and-destroy" operations in the South. Cutting back search-and-destroy efforts would reduce the U.S. to a static defense posture little different from the enclave stance. These swift, surprise sweeps of Viet Cong territory have kept the guerrillas off-balance, deprived them of sanctuaries they have used for years, and prevented any large-scale attacks for three months.

∙ESCALATION. The U.S.