World: VISIT FROM AN ARAB KING

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Freedom of Action. Buoyed by war outlays and by the spending of 20,000 fedayeen in the country and 17,000 Iraqui, 7,000 Saudi and 5,000 Syrian troops now stationed there, Jordan's economy is actually in better shape than before the war. Jordan's dollar reserves are a healthy $300 million. But tourist receipts are down to a third of pre-1967 figures, and agricultural production has dropped with the loss of the West Bank. Israeli analysts sum up Jordan's economy as "financially good, but stagnant in terms of development."

Much more serious is the problem of the fedayeen. As Hussein's popularity slips, that of the commandos rises, presenting the King with a tough choice. If he decides to throw in his lot with the commandos, he risks severe retaliation from Israel, and a fourth round of war becomes a distinct possibility. On the other hand, any attempt on his part to crush the fedayeen would almost certainly result in his overthrow. Commando Chief Yasser Arafat has pledged privately not to move against Hussein—but only so long as the fedayeen continue to have freedom of action within Jordan.

That freedom can have dangerous consequences for Jordan. Within 40 minutes last week, the fedayeen poured 16 Czech-made rockets into Israel's Gulf of Aqaba port of Elath, injuring ten persons, damaging a hospital, homes and cars. At dawn, Israeli jets bombed the nearby Jordanian port of Aqaba, reportedly killing eight civilians and wounding nine others. For years, Israel and Jordan had observed an unwritten truce in the Aqaba-Elath area, largely because both ports are so conspicuously vulnerable to retaliation. With a few rockets, the fedayeen severely bent that agreement. Further attacks on Elath would almost certainly provoke full-scale Israeli retaliation on Aqaba, Jordan's only access to the sea.

Pressure on the Four. The fedayeen attack on Elath had several objectives. Not the least of the targets was Hussein himself; it was a demonstration to him and the rest of the Arab world that the fedayeen can call their shots whenever they please. The upsurge of violence was undoubtedly aimed for effect on the Big Four as well. The combination of commando intransigence with the Hussein-Nasser six-point plan for peace could not help increasing pressure on the Big Four to seek an easing of Israeli demands.

In his talks with Nixon and Rogers, Hussein learned that Nixon shares his concern that the danger of a new outbreak of fighting is near—although lower-level State Department officials see it differently. Nixon and Rogers told Hussein that the U.S. firmly supports the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territories, but that it will not become involved in drawing boundary lines on maps. Those matters, the Administration believes, must be negotiated by the Arabs and the Israelis, either directly or under the auspices of the United Nations.