World: NATO ENTERS THE THIRD DECADE

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As the two-day Washington meeting opened, Italy's Pietro Nenni argued that NATO should take the Communists at their word and agree, at least in principle, to the European conference. Similarly, West Germany's Willy Brandt, whose Ostpolitik has placed a high priority on seeking an East-West settlement, felt that NATO should be willing to dare a little for the sake of détente. But French Foreign Minister Michel Debre, whose President set off the great wave of bridge building to the East two years ago, urged extreme caution. Debre warned that if the European peace conference failed to make any progress, it would be a greater setback to the hope for better relations than if no conference took place. (As a sign that Charles de Gaulle is himself no longer so convinced of the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions, Debré, in an earlier speech to the National Press Club, reaffirmed France's political commitment to the Atlantic Alliance—though the French still refuse to take part in NATO's military activities.)

Canadian Withdrawal. Debre's warning about a possible backlash was buttressed by the U.K.'s Michael Stewart and U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, who emphasized the improbability that one great conference could bring an end to the divisions that have rent Europe for more than 25 years. The final communique reflected a cautious line: the NATO foreign ministers resolved "to explore with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation and an early resolution." The foreign ministers also ordered the North Atlantic Council, the alliance's highest executive body, to prepare an agenda of items that might profitably be discussed with East bloc countries.

At the same time, the foreign ministers pledged that each NATO country would keep its alliance partners fully briefed on whatever negotiations it undertook with Warsaw Pact members. In addition, the NATO ministers stressed their "continuing determination" to maintain substantial "North American and European conventional forces" in Europe. The words were a rebuke to Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who a week earlier had announced his intention of withdrawing Canadian forces from NATO assignments in Western Europe.

Overly Dependent. In his speech, Nixon called the alliance "one of the great successes of the postwar world." And indeed it is. Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe, capped by the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, prompted the creation of NATO. Behind its shield Western Europe gained a sense of security while rebuilding its economic strength. The alliance provided the frame within which West Germany was able to rearm and assume a large part of the responsibility for Western European defense without unduly frightening its Western European neighbors. NATO also helped keep peace between two members, Greece and Turkey, whose ancient enmity threatened twice—in 1964 and 1967—to flare into open fighting over Cyprus. Perhaps NATO's most critical test came in 1961, when its united stand helped face down former Premier Khrushchev over his threat to make a separate peace with East German Boss Walter Ulbricht and turn Russian responsibility for Berlin over to the East Germans.