World Battlefronts: BATTLE OF THE PACIFIC: Ruin in Two Phases

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There were some bad landings and planes were wrecked on the packed decks; many pilots chose the wrong carriers. But from 95 planes lost to enemy action and "extreme range," all but 22 pilots and 27 crewmen were saved.

In the middle of the night, weary flyers slumped in ready-room armchairs, told Intelligence officers what they had hit:

One Hayataka-class* carrier sunk; two tankers sunk; a destroyer sunk; another Hayataka-class carrier "severely damaged and left burning furiously"; a Zuikaku-class carrier hit by three 1,000-lb. bombs; a light Zuiho-class carrier hit by two aerial torpedoes; another light carrier perforated by seven 500-pounders; a Kongo-class battleship, three cruisers, two destroyers and three tankers damaged. Of the few Jap planes remaining to defend their ships 26 had been shot down.

The battered southern fleet had escaped through Luzon Strait (between Luzon and Formosa). It had a choice of bases (see map) for repairs and refits. The Battle of the Eastern Philippines was ended.

The Big Score. For the two weeks of U.S. campaigning in the far Pacific, from the Bonins to the Philippine Sea, the summary of Jap losses, released this week by the U.S. Navy, was even more horrific for Shimada to contemplate.

In 14 baleful days the Jap Navy: ¶ Lost 30 ships sunk, plus two probably sunk. Fifty-one more were damaged. ¶ Lost 13 landing barges, complete with packed crews, most of them on the way to reinforce the garrison at Saipan. ¶ Lost 757 aircraft destroyed by U.S. aircraft and ack-ack.

For this price the enemy had got almost nothing. The U.S. Navy, in addition to four ships damaged, lost only 151 aircraft, rescued all but 98 of their crews.

Delimited Liability. In these weeks, Shimada had learned a lesson he should have known: there are no bargain counters in the marts of war.

This week even his own people could see that the entire Pacific, as far west as the meridian of Tokyo (140° E. Long.), was now an American lake. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander in chief of three Pacific fleets, had said: "I don't know anything more we could do to provoke those people into a fleet action."

This week Shimada had to make a new set of plans to stave off the Americans, who certainly intend to plow into his inner defenses. Except for his German counterpart, no leader had the impossible alternatives that lay before Shimada. He could come out and fight, hurl his whole force against the U.S. fleet. The result would be destruction. Or he could stand on his one thrust at the enemy and keep his fleet in being, a threat that might never be used but that would have to be reckoned with. Or he could spend his fleet piecemeal in harassing action, postponing the day of defeat. His choice was between bad, worse and worst.

Cherry Ripe., Stubby, troubled Shimada, with his Prussian hairdo and his overripe cherry mouth, was not going to feel the warm smile of history. But he had worked hard to win it. No less than six times he had been assigned to the General Staff; the first five were considered successful. Between these tours of duty he had commanded a submarine division, a cruiser, the battleship Hiei, finally (in 1940 and early 1941) the Third Fleet, entrusted with blockade of the China coast toward which Nimitz now aims.