Anchor for Asia

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"We shall take care not to align ourselves with one group or another ... remaining neutral on those [questions] not affecting us directly . . . India obviously cannot join either of the two blocs . . . What she desires is an understanding between Russia and the U.S."

In his autobiography, written during the early '30s in British jails, Nehru gave unstinted praise to the "great Lenin" and the "great new [Soviet Russian] world." His sentiments may have changed since then. He has come to deplore Communist methods. As Prime Minister, he has sanctioned stiff police action against India's Reds, jailing hundreds of them for terror and sabotage. He has (somewhat quaintly) denounced Indian Reds as "the greatest enemy to the cause of Communism."

Outlook. This is how Nehru views specific areas of conflict in Asia:

China is lost to Communism. "The Nationalist government," says Nehru, "had some good elements but also some bad ones. Its failure to get rid of the bad elements was its downfall." Delhi will follow London's lead in the matter of recognizing the Chinese Communist People's Republic.

Indo-China does not want the French, with or without former Emperor Bao Dai. Nehru regards Bao Dai as a puppet of the French, and he would rather take a reluctant chance on Communist Ho Chi Minh than back the French. But, under British and American persuasion, Delhi is keeping mum about Indo-China.

Indonesia must have independence.

Burma has shown governmental weakness because its democratic leadership was liquidated. India has done all it can to strengthen Thakin Nu's government.

Power & Persuasion. The overall answer to Asia's crisis, in Nehru's view, is not an Asian alliance against Communism. Ideological and military defense are not enough. The basic battle must be fought on the economic and political front. Communism can be defeated only after colonialism goes, and after the living standards of Asia's masses are raised. This is where American abundance and generosity could come in. Nehru recognizes the need for U.S. food, capital and technical aid in India and elsewhere. It would not be wise to wait until Communism in Southeast Asia reached the Chinese or Greek stage where it must be fought with guns.

This week the U.S. seemed inclined to go a long way toward the support of nationalism in Southeast Asia—provided it was not of the Red variety. But the U.S. was dubious of Nehru's Third Force position, his pan-Asiatic leanings, his inclination to see the U.S. and Russia as equally bad imperialist powers. In Washington's view, the problem was to persuade Jawaharlal Nehru that there was only one aggressive power design in the world—the Communist—and everybody else was in the same non-Communist boat.

"The real nub of this business," said one Washington hand last week, "is for Nehru to see the country. If we are as good as we think we are, he ought to like us for ourselves."