CEASE-FIRE: The Fallacy of Momentum

• Share

The normal condition of the Korean truce talks is deadlock. After a major concession by one side or the other, a brief spurt of progress usually follows, and then the deadlock settles down again. Hopeful observers who in July hoped for peace in August, and in October hoped for peace in November, and now hope for peace by New Year's, suffer from what might be called the fallacy of momentum. They assume that each spurt of progress will generate enough energy to carry the negotiators quickly over all the remaining obstacles. It never seems to work out that way. The Communists are old hands at the deadlock business.

Last fortnight the Red negotiators at Panmunjom seemed to be making a big concession when they agreed—in principle —to supervision of the armistice (after it is signed) by behind-the-lines inspection. Last week, when the matter was handed over to two-man subcommittees, it soon became clear that the big Red concession was as full of tricks as a magician's trunk. The situation at week's end: deadlock.

Answer, Please. The Red negotiators had suggested that observer teams be manned by nationals of "neutral" countries. What did they mean by neutral? They said they meant nations that had sent no fighting forces to Korea. For example? Well, for example, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Would Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark qualify? Well, yes, the Communists said.

The Reds had proposed that, after the armistice, U.N. warships should be barred from the "coastal waters" of North Korea. How far out from the shore do coastal waters extend? the U.N. asked. "It is not necessary," the Red spokesman answered, "for us to tell you how far is coastal." But the U.N. persisted. Three miles? Twelve miles? Farther than that, the Reds said. The U.N. negotiators concluded that the Reds would bar the allies from sailing the high seas, in the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan.

The Communists had proposed that the inspection teams confine their inspection to "ports of entry." Did this include airfields? No, the Reds said. To the U.N. this answer meant that the enemy intended, after the armistice, to build airstrips in North Korea (and repair existing ones) in order to bring his 1,400-plane air force, now principally based in Manchuria, closer to U.N. lines.

A "freeze" of existing troops, weapons and ammunition in Korea had been proposed by the Reds. Could the U.N. continue to rotate Eighth Army troops, replace worn-out weapons and ammunition used up in training (mostly of South Koreans)—if it was done without raising existing limits? No, the Reds answered.

To save time while Item 3 (supervision of the armistice) was being thrashed out, the U.N. wanted another subcommittee appointed to work simultaneously on Item 4, which concerns exchange of prisoners. The Reds said only that they were taking it under advisement. By week's end, U.N. briefing officers were telling correspondents that the Reds were using the prisoner question as "blackmail" and as a "human club" held over the U.N.'s head.