FOREIGN RELATIONS: Broad-Picture Man

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Korea. Last May, through an artfully casual conversation with India's Nehru, Dulles warned the Chinese Communists that if the Korean truce talks broke down once again the U.S. would have to enlarge the war. Two months later the Communists signed the armistice. The terms left many Americans unhappy, but no one disputed the proposition that a diplomatic stalemate was preferable to a military stalemate. Dulles has been careful to keep up his relations with Korea's stubborn Syngman Rhee in the face of bitter anti-Rhee sentiment among U.S. allies. Aware that the armistice terms do not allow for a resumption of hostilities if the political conference is not held, Dulles expected the Reds to stall (as they have) on preparations for this meeting. The Communists know that they can scarcely improve on their present position at a political conference. Rhee represents the only solid pressure that can be exerted on the Chinese Reds in Korea. By visiting Rhee, by refusing to join the attack on him, Dulles has aligned himself with an Asian leader whose courage and obstinacy have won increasing respect in other Asian countries. Anti-Communism is growing in Asia, and Rhee, not Nehru, is its symbol.

Indo-China. In a series of carefully mortised negotiations from Saigon to Washington to Paris, Dulles persuaded the French government to promise General Henri Navarre enough troops to carry out "the Navarre Plan" for defeating the Communist-led Viet Minh rebels. The U.S.'s quid for France's quo: a promise of $385 million in aid over the next year for the war in Indo-China. Under Dulles' pressure France also gave assurances of independence to the native states of Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam. This meant that Indo-Chinese nationalists were no longer faced with a choice between Communism and colonialism. Result: new hope for winning the seven-year-old Indo-China war and stopping the Communist advance into Southeast Asia.

Japan. Dulles' insistent public demands for Japanese rearmament were received with ill grace by Prime Minister Yoshida, because of the political explosiveness of the issue. Last week, however, Japan's two largest political parties announced their joint support of a rearmament program that will reduce the power vacuum in northeast Asia.

In the Middle East, Dulles warded off impending disaster. Items:

Iran. Dulles and U.S. Ambassador Loy Henderson refused to pay blackmail to shifty, dictatorial Premier Mohammed Mossadegh. In so doing they were running a risk that Mossadegh would retaliate by turning oil-rich Iran over to the Communists. The gamble paid off when the Iranian people rose to support the Shah, overthrew Mossadegh and gave the U.S. another chance in Iran.

Egypt. Last May, Egypt's General Mohammed Naguib and his military junta were threatening war unless Britain ended her occupation of the Suez Canal zone. In three days in Egypt, Dulles impressed on Naguib the importance the U.S. attached to Britain's Suez base, the biggest military installation in the Middle East. Since Dulles' visit, Britain and Egypt have made progress toward an agreement which will give Egypt control of the Canal Zone but allow British military technicians to operate the base until Egyptians are taught to do so.

In Europe the Communists had been thrown onto the defensive. Items: