FOREIGN RELATIONS: Broad-Picture Man

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East Germany. The U.S. reacted to last June's Berlin riots by arranging the distribution of U.S. food parcels to the hungry East Germans. This helped to keep alive East German resistance to Soviet rule and illustrated Dulles' claim that the U.S. can pursue an effective "liberation policy" without violence.

European Defense Community. Long after most European statesmen had written off the EDC plan for an international European army, Dulles continued to plug for it. His stubbornness began to bear fruit last month when West Germany showed its growing strength and political stability by re-electing Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, a strong EDC partisan. France, which had blocked EDC, suddenly reawakened to the danger that the U.S. might insist on independent German rearmament if EDC did not materialize. Result: the French government seemed to be moving toward acceptance of EDC, and prospects for a West German contribution to the defense of Europe looked better than they had in two years.

Spain. Three years ago, U.S. military men led by the late Admiral Forrest Sherman convinced the Truman Administration that the U.S. must have air and naval bases in Spain in order to defend Europe. But in the ensuing horse-trading, the State Department failed to put enough pressure on Franco. Last January, under new management, the State Department began to move briskly. Last week the U.S. finally got its Spanish bases.

Desire & Accomplishment. Necessarily, many of John Foster Dulles' achievements start from plans, decisions and achievements of the Truman Administration. Had there been no Berlin airlift, the U.S. would not now be in a position to capitalize upon East German unrest. Had there been no Marshall Plan, EDC would not even be a dream. But Dulles has not merely kept U.S. power in position to contain the enemy. Unlike Dean Acheson, he has also sought every opportunity to use that power actively against the Communists. Even in matters where Dulles and Acheson were in total agreement as to objectives, there was a difference between the two: Acheson acquired a brilliant grasp of the details involved; Dulles got things done.

Dulles' record of accomplishment was not a result of skill as a diplomatic negotiator. As the unsurpassed technician of the conference table, Acheson's performance was far smoother, and Dulles gave his predecessor full marks for good intention and did not claim that his own desire for such laudable goals as peace was any greater than Acheson's. But there is more to getting a peace than wanting it, more to working toward decisions than suavity and adroitness at the conference table. A statesman who wants peace has to find specific policies which will lead his adversary to make—and keep—agreements. Not until effective policies have been established can negotiating skill show any results. It is at the all-important level-where principle is translated into policy that Dulles has had more success than Acheson.