One Major Power

Written in tones of resignation—to domestic economics and to the march of progress in Atomic Age weapons—Great Britain's message to the world was a historic landmark in military history. The British decision to convert almost completely to nuclear-armed missiles (see FOREIGN NEWS) had deep meaning for all of the world, but for the U.S. it had very special significance. Said the British White Paper: "The free world is today mainly dependent for its protection upon the nuclear capacity of the U.S."

Fortunately, the U.S. was ready. Beginning with the New Look military program in 1953, the U.S. moved ahead in adjusting itself to the demands of modern warfare. Britain's "terrible reassessment" came as an acceptance of the "massive-retaliation" policy enunciated by John Foster Dulles in 1954 and of the prematurely publicized Radford Plan of last year—both widely condemned in Britain on first hearing. Washington had plenty of notice about its ally's latest plans. Britain's Harold Macmillan told Dulles last December at a NATO meeting that the United Kingdom would have to trim its defense budget and worldwide military commitments. Defense Minister Duncan Sandys gave further details during his successful missile-shopping trip to Washington in February; Macmillan gave a full explanation to President Eisenhower during their Bermuda conference.

The Shock of History. Despite its readiness, Washington, especially legislators and newsmen who were not keeping up on the revolutionary events in military weapons, had a sense of shock when the British announcement came. But neither the military nor the White House sent up cries of alarm: the only question about the British decision was when it would come. And now that it had come, its effect on other questions—the balance of U.S. defense forces, the might of troop contributions by NATO nations, etc., could be met as they developed.

The greatest point of concern in Washington was what would develop in NATO. The British White Paper came on the day that General Lauris Norstad and his top aides were observing NATO's eighth anniversary, and the question that immediately presented itself was: Will the British decision start a chain reaction for reduction of forces among the other NATO allies, e.g., France and Italy? In the new distribution of power, there would be a new and different premium on the West German ground forces, whose General Hans Speidel has just taken over as Norstad's commander of allied land forces in Central Europe.

The Bald Fact. In the main, U.S. military leaders were making no plans to leap in and take over British positions and obligations around the world. In most key areas, the U.S. has capabilities that do not need reinforcement. The U.S. undoubtedly will have to shift some forces to correct imbalances resulting from the new British program. But those will be mostly intertheater shifts and probably will not require additional overseas troop shipments. As for brush wars of the Korea type, the U.S. long ago made its decision entirely apart from anything the British might say or do: such wars will be fought with atomic weapons and missiles.