Guilty & Proud

Few accusations of modern diplomatic history have been greeted with more outraged and indignant official snorts and denials than the charge that Britain, France and Israel conspired and colluded to invade Egypt and take over Suez last October (TIME, Nov. 12). In Britain, the guilty soul-searching that went on after the attack on Suez—and still continues—led, together with his ill health, to Sir Anthony Eden's resignation. But even those Britons who most roundly denounced the Suez invasion were still for the most part serenely convinced that Britain had most certainly not been guilty of conspiracy.

French Without Tears. Unlike their English allies, the French have been noticeably without tears about the Suez attack—except to the extent that it failed. This week all France was reveling in what seemed to French eyes a complete vindication of their position. In a bestselling book titled Les Secrets de I'expédition d'Egypte, two of France's best-known journalists, Merry and Serge Bromberger, one the chief correspondent (in Indo-China, North Africa and Suez) for Paris-Presse, the other the military correspondent of Figaro, describe what they saw in Egypt and what they have put together since.

To the hotly disputed accusation of conspiracy, the brothers Bromberger file a luridly written but well-researched plea (they are known to have the close confidence of the French general staff and of Defense Minister Bourges-Maunoury himself). The plea: guilty and proud of it.

The Brombergers describe it as a French-inspired conspiracy in which both Britain and Israel were junior and somewhat reluctant partners. Britain went along, say the Brombergers, despite her traditional hostility to Israel and her desire to maintain her position in the Arab world. Israel was hesitant because Prime Minister Ben-Gurion foresaw that bringing Anglo-French forces into the attack would have seriously adverse effects on world opinion.

The Allies Were Enemies. The Brombergers say that from the outset there was a wide divergence of opinion on objectives between the French and the British. The British wanted simply to ensure free transit through the canal. But the Apriority French objective was the destruction of Egypt's Nasser in a flanking movement that would shore up their disintegrating position in Algeria. To this end the French were ready to make common cause with any like-minded ally. The British, who a fortnight before the actual invasion were still thinking about bombing the Israelis if they moved on Jordan, wanted no alliance whatever with Israel. Thus, the Brombergers observe wryly, "the French government found itself on the eve of the intervention with two allies who regarded each other as enemies."