THE NATION: Pandit & President

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With an air and manner about him that compelled attention, India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was the Man in the News last week, and in his t ypical indefatigable way, he made a lot of it. He had come to the U.S. primarily to talk with the President on the problems and promises of the world. But along his word-strewn way he shook a multitude of hands, graced a dozen receptions, closeted himself a dozen times with dozens of officials, dined with Eleanor Roosevelt, lunched with Dag Hammarskjold, raised his goblet of orange juice in dozens of toasts, changed the tiny, ubiquitous rose in his ubiquitous achkan dozens of times.

His public pronouncements caught the headlines, but from the standpoint of future U.S.-Indian relationships, the talks between President and Prime Minister probably were more important. Ike was anxious to establish a personal relationship with the forceful Pandit; Nehru, for his part, had much to learn about the President who had just been given a resounding mandate in re-election and had used his influence so effectively in both the Suez and Hungarian crises.

Peking's Hopes. The talks began in Washington, shifted to Ike's farm in Gettysburg, then back to Washington, lasting in all more than 14 hours. Laced into the discussions was some small talk, ranging from Nehru's interest in Ike's painting (and Ike's enthusiasm for the works of Grandma Moses) to Ike's short lecture, during a brief inspection of his property, on the problems of cattle breeding, which seemed to leave the Prime Minister singularly unexcited. What surprised Ike most was that Nehru, in private, dropped his customary tendency toward heady circumlocutions (see below) on the big problems and got precisely down to specifics. So did Ike. Some of the specifics, as reported by TIME'S White House Correspondent John Steele:

Speaking as an "honest broker" for Chou Enlai, Nehru suggested that the Red Chinese had made several steps toward a "normalizing" of relations with the U.S., reported that Chou was deeply hurt at the U.S.'s rebuff. Why, wondered Nehru, does not the President recognize "realities" by recognizing Chou's government? To which Ike, talking like a civics teacher, briefed Nehru on the realities of American politics. Recognition of Red China, he explained, would require full congressional cooperation, e.g., Senate approval of any ambassador-designate.

Ike said that he could not count on any help along those lines from the Republican Party; any such attempt would mean a split with his party, open warfare with Senate Minority Leader William Knowland. Well, asked Nehru, why doesn't the U.S. at least relax its trade embargoes with Red China? Patiently the President explained that until Peking proves itself a more acceptable member of the international community, he has no intention of recommending such action.