POLAND: The Greater Risk

Poland's wiry Wladyslaw Gomulka was quietly pleased. Into Warsaw last week flew Russia's Foreign Minister Dmitry Shepilov and Defense Minister Georgy Zhukov. They got no ceremonial welcome, and they stayed less than 24 hours. But before they left, they had put their names to the first public Russian agreement conceding a satellite any rights to the movement and disposal of Soviet troops stationed on its territory.

On paper, at least, the 21-article agreement was a model of scrupulous regard between self-respecting allies. The Russians conceded that their troops would not move from their bases or conduct training exercises without Polish consent. Soviet military personnel would "respect and observe" Polish law, be tried in Polish courts for any crimes or misdemeanors committed against the Polish population. The Russians promised never, never to use their troops to influence Polish domestic affairs, and the document emphasized and reiterated that their stay was "temporary."

"Dear Comrade." Some crucial questions were still to "be determined by special agreement." One: Who will pay for the support of the troops? In Moscow last month Gomulka had indicated that the Russians had agreed to shoulder all expenses. Another question concerned the number, deployment and movement of Soviet units into and out of the country. Gomulka had already agreed that six Russian divisions should stay on in Poland "protecting the sanctity of the Oder-Neisse line," but during the October crisis the Russians had moved in a reported five extra divisions. Presumably, the Poles were negotiating to get them out.

After the signing, toasts were cordial. Polish Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz toasted "dear Comrade Shepilov" and "dear Comrade Zhukov." Shepilov saluted "friendly and fraternal Poland," hailed the agreement as "a striking example of a new type of international relations established among socialist countries."

What Russia promises and what Russia delivers are often two different things. But Western experts consider the agreement a clear victory for Gomulka. For contrast, they point to the treatment of the Rumanian delegation that recently journeyed to Moscow to ask for a similar agreement. The Rumanians were baldly told that Russian troops will remain in Rumania, and that was that. By its very existence, the Polish agreement created a hope and a promise to the Poles that the Russians must meet their obligations—or arouse the Poles' anger if they do not.

Dearer Prize. In Russian eyes Poland is a greater prize and a greater risk than Hungary. Poland is industrialized, populous (27.5 million) and strategically lodged between Berlin and Moscow. Hungary is agricultural, far less populous (9,800,000) and relatively remote. The Polish army has 25 divisions (to Hungary's 15) —or numerically more divisions than France. Britain or the U.S.