Foreign Relations: The Ugly Choice

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Since the day that the Bay of Pigs became a synonym for fiasco, U.S. policy toward Cuba has been based on hope—the hope that Castro's Communism would somehow curl up its toes and die. In its most positive form, that policy aimed at isolating Cuba, both economically and politically. It did not work — for the simple and foreseeable reason that Nikita Khrushchev did not want it to.

The U.S.S.R. has long propped up Castro's chaotic economy and trickled in military aid. But in late July, the trickle be came a torrent; since then, according to U.S. intelligence figures, 61 ships carrying Soviet arms and men have arrived in Cuba or are on the way. The Kennedy Administration said little about the Cuba buildup — until New York Republican Kenneth Keating rose on the Senate floor, outlined what he had heard about the Russian shipments, demanded that the Administration tell the U.S. what was going on. Others took up the cry, and under mounting pressure President Kennedy de cided to issue an official statement.

"Whatever Necessary." That statement had a resolute ring. "The Castro regime," said the President, "will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere." Those words were echoed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Meeting in his office with 19 Latin American envoys, Rusk pledged that the U.S. would use "whatever means may be necessary" to prevent aggression by Cuba.

Yet both Kennedy and Rusk attempted to minimize the Cuba threat, harped on three points as proof that the U.S. should not and cannot intervene directly in Cuba.

∙There is no evidence, Kennedy insisted, "of any significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance." His argument: the Russian arms, including 25-mile antiaircraft missiles and torpedo boats with 15-mile guided missiles, are defensive in nature. But the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons is a dangerous one; it all depends on how the weapons are used, whom they are pointed at, and how mobile they are. It is a bitter fact that many tyrants—including Hitler —have built aggressive war machines while claiming to arm only for defense.

∙There is also no evidence, Kennedy said, of "any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet-bloc country." He stressed that the Russians landing in Cuba are not troops but technicians—and he seemed to take comfort from that fact. But Castro does not need troops; he has all the home-grown gun toters he can use. What he does need, and what he is getting. is the electronics, radar and missile experts so vital to modern warfare.

∙The U.S., Kennedy argued, can only deal with Cuba "as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats to peace." As explained to congressional leaders at a White House briefing, this means the U.S. should not intervene directly against Cuba because it might inspire Khrushchev to heat up other cold war trouble spots—Berlin, Laos, South Viet Nam. As policy, this thinking amounts to absolute sterility. For, carried to its logical extreme, it would prohibit the U.S. from taking effective action against Communist aggression anywhere.