World: Middle East: At Last, a Way Out?

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Achieving a cease-fire may prove far easier on the Suez front than on Israel's northern and eastern borders. In Jordan, King Hussein's power has been considerably diminished by Palestinian guerrillas living in his country. There, as in Israel, the Cabinet debate was intense last week before the King finally cabled Nasser that "we accept what you accept and reject what you reject." But consenting to the cease-fire is just about as far as Hussein feels he can go. Hussein has already informed the U.S. embassy that he does not intend to be responsible for the guerrillas. The Jordanian army will not support guerrilla attacks moving over the Jordan River into Israel or allow the commandos to fire across the river themselves. But whether even these promises can be enforced is doubtful. The same is true of Lebanon to the north, from where the commandos operate with impunity in defiance of the fragile Beirut government. Indeed, the Palestinian irregulars could prove the thorniest obstacle to a peace treaty (see box page 22).

Israel's Doubts

Israel, in its debate on a ceasefire, was concerned not only about the Arab leaders' ability to keep the peace but also, surprisingly, about U.S. intentions. After the 1956 Suez crisis, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles threatened to vote for U.N. sanctions against Israel unless the Israelis acceded to U.N. demands that they evacuate territory in Sinai and the Gaza Strip captured during the fighting. President Eisenhower informed Israeli Premier David Ben-Gurion that the U.S., in return for withdrawal, would support Israel's right to passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran.

On the strength of these assurances, Ben-Gurion ordered Mrs. Meir, who at that time was Israel's Foreign Minister, to inform the United Nations that Israel would withdraw. After Israel carried out the withdrawal, however, nothing more was done. Nasser refused to let Israeli ships transit the Suez Canal, and he eventually trained the guns of Sharm el Sheikh to block the Straits of Tiran and deny passage to the Israeli port of Eilat—an action that caused the 1967 war. Israeli policy has since become more pragmatic and more demanding, and Israel seeks firmer assurances before making such moves as the Rogers proposal contemplates. "The ghosts of '57 are walking the corridors of power here this week," said one Israeli official.

The item on which the Cabinet divided was the question of withdrawal not only from Sinai and Gaza but also at some point from the Golan Heights and other territory captured in the third Israeli-Arab war in '67. Israel's political peculiarity for 22 years—some call it the national weakness—has been its "wall-to-wall" Cabinets drawn from broadly differing political factions in order to demonstrate and preserve national unity. Mrs. Meir's Cabinet includes six members of the right-wing Gahal Party who are the foremost hawks in Israel's hawk-dove debates over occupied territories (see box page 23). Gahal, which also holds 26 of the 120 seats in the Israeli parliament, believes that the territories should be permanently retained to insure Israel's security. Against the advice of even some of his own party members, Gahal Leader Menahem Begin last week chose to make the withdrawal issue a matter of party policy.