MIDDLE EAST: Searching for New Roles

• Share

THERE was a striking lack of official comment from Washington and Moscow last week on Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's sudden decision to evict his army of Soviet advisers. In fact, it was almost as if this strange turn in Middle Eastern affairs had not taken place at all. There was, of course, a good reason why the two big powers were maintaining a low profile: neither seemed to have a clear idea of what could, or should, happen next. The two superpowers seemed equally nonplussed by the diplomatic setback that a client state had handed one of them and by the potential political realignments that Sadat's desperate maneuvering had suddenly made possible.

Matters were not much clarified by Sadat, although he was hardly standing mute. Last week, behind a motorcycle escort, the Egyptian President zipped across Cairo in his Mercedes-Benz 600 to Cairo University's domed Nasser Hall; there he addressed 1,750 delegates to an Arab Socialist Union Congress assembled to celebrate the 20th anniversary of Nasser's revolution. In a remarkable wide-ranging speech that lasted four hours (see next page), Sadat alluded to the expulsion of the Russians only in meager and unrevealing phrases. Much of his address was taken up with angry denunciations of Israel and of U.S. policy toward the Middle East. Sadat concluded with the statement that Egypt was willing to go to war alone if necessary to recover its lost territories.

Two days after Sadat's marathon spasm of rhetoric, Israeli Premier Golda Meir delivered a comparatively brief (44-minute) statement to the Knesset. Mrs. Meir's speech was carrot after stick. "Boldness and political responsibility have been rewarded," she began. "Thanks to this policy, Israel is stronger today in every respect." But she ended with a low-key leader-to-leader appeal to Sadat: "Let us meet as equals and make a joint supreme effort to arrive at an agreed solution. We have not declared permanent borders, we have not drawn up an ultimative map, we have not demanded prior commitments on matters which must be clarified by means of negotiations."

Deliberately, no timetable was set for such a meeting. "She didn't say 'Come to Cyprus next Monday,' " an Israeli diplomat explained later. "She was putting forward a concept, an idea." But the concept—direct negotiations between Israel and Egypt—has become a familiar one since the Six Day War, and Cairo quickly dismissed it. In a second, shorter speech in Alexandria last week Sadat asked: "Can anyone negotiate while his land is occupied? Did the U.S. negotiate with Japan after Pearl Harbor?" That left the principal Middle East adversaries—Egypt, Israel, Russia and the U.S.—all casting about to redefine their roles.

Egypt's position is the most complex. Indications are that the Russian exodus is much larger than Western watchers had first anticipated. It now seems likely that up to 90% of the 15,000 to 20,000 Soviet men (and women, in communications units) stationed in Egypt may leave. The first departures were not without rancor. At least one fight between Soviet and Egyptian soldiers was reported; newsmen attempting to take pictures of the exiting Russians had their cameras smashed.