Time to Back Up?

Has "unconditional surrender" become an Allied shibboleth which may prolong the war? London's informed, forthright Sunday Observer raised the question, subjected the doctrine's European implications to penetrating analysis. Condensed, the Observer's argument runs:

Unconditional surrender is an American idea dating from the U.S. Civil War, a conflict in which one side or the other had to give in completely. Europe offers no U.S. parallel. "No European nation or coalition of nations is in a position effectively to accept the unconditional surrender of another nation, that is, to manage and govern it, unless in fact it is prepared to annex it."

Britain's adherence to unconditional surrender is based on: 1) the determination to reform and re-educate Germany; 2) the equal determination to avoid any truck whatever with Hitler and his gang; 3) the acceptance of the argument that a war between ideas means a European civil war rather than one between nations. In the Observer's opinion, the first aim is somewhat impractical, the second is necessary but "unconditional surrender" is no way to go about it. And the third is fallacious because Europe's war is not a civil war—the Germans rebelled not against an established European authority, but against a pattern of European life. Furthermore, the Allies impede rather than forward their aims by creating a feeling of last-ditch desperation among all Germans.

The Observer concludes that unconditional surrender has now become an unnecessary bar to quick peace. It has made the Germans fight for "naked life"; it has aroused "a Dunkirk spirit." Says the Observer: "If we [Britain, the U.S., Russia] remove that obstacle on our side, it may be a potent means of aiding our fighting men to bring down the obstacle on the enemy side."

"Unconditional surrender" was coined at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. Prime Minister Churchill pointedly gave President Roosevelt full credit for it, told the House of Commons that he "concurred." Its acceptance altered, toughened British propaganda policy toward Germany. Both Churchill and Roosevelt repeatedly tried to soften the harsh threat by assuring the people of enemy countries that unconditional surrender would not mean their destruction. But the propaganda weapon they put in Hitler's hands could not be offset by qualification.