FOREIGN RELATIONS: Journey to Stuttgart

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The Major Role. In the capitals of Europe—except London, which wholeheartedly approved—there was not even mild applause. French factions of the left and right, with Frenchmen's historical yearning for the Ruhr and the Rhineland and Frenchmen's historical fear of Germany, attacked Byrnes bitterly. Poles, who have taken for granted their permanent possession of Silesia, paraded before the Warsaw residence of U.S. Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane, shouting, "Down with the defenders of Germany."

Russia, for the moment, was silent. Two months ago Molotov had made virtually the same proposals. Russia's bid for German friendship had been the opening gambit in the new game. Russia would appreciate Byrnes's countering move. Moscow newspapers printed a 200-word report of his speech, which had taken 4,800 words.

For Americans, who could read every word, it was a mark in history. Only a century and a half had passed since Washington had asked what was then a rhetorical question: "Why . . . entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?" At Potsdam the U.S. had accepted without reservation a supporting role in all the toils of Europe. Now, after months of disappointments, disillusionments, diplomatic setbacks and frustrations, Byrnes was determined that the U.S. should fight it out on Russia's chosen ground, alone if necessary. Europe's toils were now the world's, and the role of the U.S. was no longer merely supporting. It was a major role.

Could Byrnes be sure that his countrymen stood behind him in his offerings and denials, and his challenge?

With him on his journey to Stuttgart were Tom Connally and Arthur Vandenberg, the Senate's Democratic and Republican leaders in foreign affairs. Reporters met and questioned them. What did they think of Byrnes's speech? Said Vandenberg laconically: "Silence means approval."