COMMAND: Education of a General

(3 of 8)

As a graceful gesture to the Japanese, the Far East headquarters have now been moved out of the Dai Ichi Building, seven year symbol of U.S. prestige and domination, to a group of long, buff-colored buildings on Tokyo's outskirts, which once housed the Japanese War Ministry.

Having appraised his command and ticked off what changes he wanted made, Clark turned to the Korean dilemma. His 8:30 a.m. briefers gave him the figures on the enemy buildup—some 1,800 planes, 1,000,000 men, vast piles of war material. The general could see that the enemy, by his holding attack at the truce table, had greatly improved his position since a year ago. How had this come about?

Toe the Line. When Lieut. General Nam II and his partners in crime came to the truce table at Kaesong last July 10, the Communist armies were in bad shape. From their last two spring offensives, they had reeled back with losses of probably 250,000 men. Epidemics of some sort were raging in North Korea, and presumably further crippling the Red fighting forces. Moreover, the Eighth Army, which Matt Ridgway had turned into a first-class fighting machine, had proved by its "meat-grinder" counteroffensives that it could grind some 90 miles farther north to the line where the peninsula widens out, swallowing up Pyongyang (the North Koreans' capital, which they had lost once before) and some 15,000 more square miles of Red territory.

The U.N. generals and admirals understood perfectly well that it was desperation that brought the Chinese and North Koreans to the conference table. Some on the U.N. side suspected from the first that the enemy did not intend to make peace, but only to win a breathing spell. The U.N. made it plain to the Communists that the fighting would go on until the armistice was signed and sealed. The U.N. morale was high; the prevalent attitude was that the enemy would have to toe the line if he wanted a truce. The State Department thought the truce talks might last as long as four weeks. In the year that has followed, the Washington masterminds have allowed the high morale, the healthy pugnacity, to be frittered away. That year is a profitable lesson in the education of a general.

When Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy and his team reached Kaesong for the first session, they found the city taken over by armed Communists. By propaganda and picture, the Reds represented themselves as victors. Ridgway squelched that with an ultimatum; neutralize Kaesong or no more truce talks. The Reds succumbed. After some further jockeying for face, which Ridgway won hands down, the delegates got on to formulate an agenda.

Breakoff & Backfire. This was the substance and order of the agenda that emerged: 1) first adopt the agenda; 2) locate the cease-fire line; 3) provide safeguards for the truce; 4) arrange exchange of prisoners; 5) and finally, agree on recommendations (not binding) to the belligerent governments. In putting the cease-fire line at the top of the substantive items, the wily Reds had laid a trap which the U.N. woke up to, later on.