COMMAND: Education of a General

(4 of 8)

The first trouble came when the U.N. made its demand for a cease-fire line along the battlefront. Enemy negotiators seemed to be taken aback; Dean Acheson, Trygve Lie and even Matt Ridgway had indicated that peace might be made on the 38th parallel. The Reds stood fast for the 38th parallel (which the U.N. regarded as "indefensible"); deadlock ensued. Meanwhile, fighting on the battlefronts had slacked off, although the Reds were already piling up fresh manpower and supplies in a new buildup. The enemy could not help but see that he might get what he wanted—relief from pressure—if he could stall for time. The Communists charged a U.N. air violation of the Kaesong site, laid out some clumsily faked "evidence" and broke off the talks for two months.

This Red maneuver backfired. Worried over the prospect of another enemy offensive, the U.N. commanders began a series of "limited offensives," designed to kill Communists, knock the enemy off strategic parcels of high ground and disrupt his buildup. This was the period of Bloody Ridge, Heartbreak Ridge, the Punchbowl and the siege of Kumsong. These actions cost the U.N. some casualties, but they cost the Reds a great many more. Matt Ridgway added to the pressure by warning the Reds that the farther the battlefront moved into North Korea, the farther north the eventual cease-fire line would be.

In October the Reds gave up Kaesong as a truce site, came back to the table at Panmunjom, and agreed to the U.N. demand for a cease-fire line along the battlefront. Optimism burgeoned; to the U.N., somewhat chastened by the long delay, peace seemed just around the corner.

Impeccable Logic. At this point, however, the U.N. delegates woke up to the Communist trap. If a cease-fire line were fixed ahead of the other three items, then the U.N. would find it psychologically difficult to fight for territory that would have to be given back when the truce was signed. But if there were no hard fighting, the enemy would be relieved of pressure, and he could stall endlessly over the remainder of the agenda. The admirals and generals at Panmunjom saw that quite clearly—and so, presumably, did Matt Ridgway. Admiral Joy had a sarcastic phrase for what the enemy was trying to get without paying for it: Joy called it a "de facto cease-fire." The U.N. delegates proposed that the cease-fire line be left to drift with the fighting line, and be fixed as the last order of business before the truce was signed. With impeccable courtroom logic, the Reds pointed out that this would be upsetting the order of the agenda. Nevertheless, the U.N. admirals and generals were dead set against giving the Reds their de facto cease-fire—and to hell with the order of the agenda.

But the Reds got the de facto cease-fire anyhow. For at this point, Washington intervened with a big plan; fix a tentative line now, along the battlefront, and if the remaining agenda items can be thrashed out in 30 days, the tentative line becomes the permanent one for the armistice. Otherwise, the tentative agreement on the line would expire, and North Korean territory would again be—theoretically—up for grabs. The U.N. delegates offered this plan to the enemy, and the Reds accepted.