INDO-CHINA: The New Frontier

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The French insist that the military problem is the No.. i problem, and that Western men and arms must lick it. Given sufficient U.S. equipment, up to $150 million a year or more, they think they can crush Ho Chi Minh within three years. Lacking such support, they may be facing a debacle within one year; and, of course, down in the wreckage would go Bao Dai.

The Piecemeal Approach. All in all, the new U.S. ally in Southeast Asia is a weak reed. And the alliance is as ironic as anything in history. For the same U.S. Government which abandoned the Chinese Nationalists because they were not good enough was committed by last fortnight's decision to defend a playboy emperor and the worst and almost the last example of white man's armed imperialism in Asia.

Nevertheless, Indo-China had to be defended—if it could be defended. So had Formosa, last stand of China's Nationalists, which has advantages not to be found in Indo-China—a strong government, a well-trained defending fighting force, and easily defensible tactical position. The U.S. decision to go into such a doubtful project as the defense of Indo-China was the result of an idea that it ought to do something, somehow, to stop the Communists in Southeast Asia. But the U.S. policy in Indo-China was a piecemeal operation. Not until it saw the Southeast Asia problem whole, until it went to the help of all threatened governments, would the U.S. be making soldier's or statesman's sense.