National Affairs: THE BUREAUCRACY: Servant or Master?

Servant or Master?

Everybody knows about the Eisenhower Administration's struggles with members of Congress. Perhaps more important in the long run is a hidden struggle inside the executive branch of the Government. This is not the too-familiar rivalry between presidential appointees; the Eisenhower Administration, so far, has been remarkably free of high-level backbiting. The significant struggle is the quiet war of the President and his appointees to get control of the vast governmental machine, manned by civil servants (and military men) who operate under protective rules designed to keep them partially independent of their nominal bosses.

The permanent establishment of the Government is not supposed to make policy. But it does. It is even more influential in strangling efforts by political appointees to change the quality and direction of Government and to make new policy.

A few figures reveal what Eisenhower & Co. are up against: out of 2,300,000 people on the federal payroll (exclusive of armed forces), the Eisenhower Administration has succeeded in appointing fewer than 2,500 of its own men, and by no means all the 2,500 are in key jobs. In the 1,200,000-man Defense Department, there are less than a score Eisenhower appointees.

The U.S. public is conditioned to read into this situation the old conflict of patronage-hungry politicians against the merit system. That conflict does exist, and the Administration would have an easier time with Congress if it had some more jobs to dole out.

But the patronage drought is relatively a very minor factor in the present struggle. Far more important is the question of whether the men who bear the constitutional and legal responsibility for running the executive branch will, in fact, be able to get into their hands the power to run it. Eisenhower promised the people reduction in the cost of Government, decentralization of power, a stronger and more coherent foreign policy and a more efficient defense policy. Whether he succeeds or fails in these promises depends largely, perhaps mainly, on his ability to get control of the permanent establishment.

Reform at a Price. In the first few decades of U.S. history, Cabinet officers hired their staffs without restriction, took credit or blame for the results. With the rise of political parties and patronage officials began to distribute jobs with an eye more to party spoils than to the nation's business.

As Government services grew more important and more complex, protests arose against the quality of public employees produced by the patronage system. After 20 years of agitation, the Pendleton Act of 1883 established a merit system of appointment for some Government employees. Steadily, but very slowly, the merit system spread within the U.S. Government. Its next sensational gain was made under Theodore Roosevelt, but even at the end of his Administration, little more than 60% of federal civilian employees had civil-service protection. Herbert Hoover extended it further until at the end of his term about 80% of employees were covered.