STRATEGY: Second Flop

STRATEGY Second Flop The second phase of the big Chinese spring offensive was as much of a bloody failure as the first.

By this week the Chinese forces were reeling back toward the 38th parallel, after suffering severe casualties (an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 in dead and wounded). The U.N. forces had given up a few miles of unimportant ground, had suffered comparatively light casualties.*

The second Chinese push was lighter than the first. Instead of the two-pronged offensive which they used the last time, they tried to ram through U.N. lines at one point; U.N. officers in Korea speculated that the Chinese might try to follow through with a series of such one-punch attacks. No one in Korea doubted that the Chinese would try again. But the basic situation—Chinese hurling masses of manpower against relentless U.N. firepower—would not change, unless the Reds decide to commit their air force.

Mao Tse-tung and his military leaders must realize by now that they cannot push the Eighth Army into the sea. What does the enemy expect to accomplish? China's only hope seemed to be that the U.S.—which can hold on in Korea but cannot decisively defeat the enemy there—would weary of the struggle.