DANGER ZONES: Tantrum at Singapore

DANGER ZONES Tantrum at Singapore U.S., British and French military men met last week for the first time to discuss a common strategy for defending Southeast Asia against the Red guerrillas in Indo-China and Malaya. The doings of the four-day session in Singapore were top secret; a communiqué said only that the talks "promise well for the future." Actually, the conference turned into a covert struggle between the French and British for U.S. support and supplies.

France's fighting General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny insisted that the major concentration of Western strength should be made in Indo-China; the British argued that their Malaya campaign was at least as important. The U.S. spokesman, Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, listened impassively, said little. De Lattre commented angrily (and unjustly) that he had been brought to Singapore on false pretenses—the British and Americans were apparently not really interested in Indo-China. Why had no Vietnamese observer been invited, even though Viet Nam was bravely fighting Communism? Then De Lattre went to his room at the residence of his host, British Commissioner-General Malcolm MacDonald. There he sulked, had to be coaxed out to dinner.

Behind De Lattre's show of temper was a serious argument: the French feel that the British are still not tough enough in their Asia policy. France wants a coordinated Western command, capable of countering Communism's offensive in Southeast Asia. After four days of discussion, De Lattre left the conference with an important promise for his Indo-China army: he would get more U.S. planes, particularly transports. But he did not get the assurance of effective military cooperation that he wanted.