Failure in Brussels

The radio voice of Pierre Mendès-France rang out across France. "I am conscious as I tackle this question that it touches the deepest chords in our national feeling. Not only does it divide Frenchmen among themselves, but it tears each one within himself."

Mendès-France admitted that he and his Cabinet had suffered "tortures" over EDC. "And yet," he said, "each of us, and first and foremost the one who heads your government, must face the truth. The truth—and our allies remind us of it everyday—is that Germany will not be excluded forever from her own defense.

"Can we, because the prospect of rearming Germany is painful to us, because to answer yes is cruel and to say no is unrealistic, can we beat about the bushes forever?" Mendes asked. His answer was proud and direct: "A great nation cannot bury its head in the sand when confronted by an unpleasant choice. It must face up, it must choose . . . We must have done with it."

Pages of Protocols. Mendès-France's way of facing up to EDC was to water down the treaty until he thought he could get it through the French Assembly. Mendès' 30 pages of protocols changed EDC so radically that what remained was neither European nor a defense community. His key protocols would have:

¶ Eliminated almost all the supranational features of the six-nation European Army;

¶ Left France (or any other nation) free to secede from EDC in case 1) Germany is unified, or 2) U.S. and British troops withdraw from the Continent;

¶ Kept German troops from being stationed on French soil, while leaving French forces in Germany;

¶ Deprived the Germans of the right to promote their own officers for at least the first four years.

Mendèes' allies were furious. "Nine-tenths unacceptable," snapped Dutch Foreign Minister Johan Willem Beyen. Cracked the Düsseldorfer Nachrichten: "The only regulation really missing is one requiring German soldiers to turn in their rifles every evening."

Special Train to Brussels. Confronted with such plain-spoken unanimity from his EDC partners, Mendes urgently needed U.S. and British backing. He signally failed to get it from the U.S. John Foster Dulles was exasperated by Mendès' suggestion that Russia would have several months' time—between the French As sembly's approval of the emasculated EDC and final ratification by the French Senate—to talk "concessions" over Germany. Said a tough State Department cable to the British Foreign Office: "A new delaying condition prior to complete ratification [would convince the U.S.] that France cannot be counted on as a reliable partner able to reach decisions."

British Ambassador to France Sir Gladwyn Jebb asked Mendes outright for an explicit guarantee that he would not abandon EDC in return for Soviet "concessions" on Germany. Mendes evaded the question. Nevertheless, as Mendes boarded his special train to Brussels, Jebb was waiting on the platform with a message brought directly from Sir Winston Churchill, promising British support.