SUEZ: To Teach a Lesson

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From all parts of the globe this week, foreign ministers of the world's major maritime powers converged on London. They were answering a summons from Britain, France and the U.S. to seek ways and means of countering Egypt's seizure of the Suez Canal. But many among the 22 powers were plainly sympathetic to Egypt. As for Egypt's dictator, Gamal Abdel Nasser, he refused to come at all.

Under such circumstances, what were the chances of stopping Nasser, or of teaching him a lesson?

The will was still there—in Britain, France and (as long as the method chosen was peaceful) in the U.S. But the way was not clear. Search as they might, the legal beagles of Downing Street, Quai d'Orsay and Foggy Bottom could find no legal challenge to Nasser's nationalization of what was in fact an Egyptian company. What they challenged firmly was the way Nasser did it—precipitantly, without negotiation—and why he did it: "To arouse Arab nationalism."

The very convoking of the conference diminished the first angry passions, giving time for cooler thoughts and, for some, colder feet. British and French politicians reconsidered their shows of militancy and, though not excluding the possibility of force, recognized that without further explanations, the world would not be on their side. Sir Anthony Eden made a somber radio-television broadcast to his countrymen. Said Sir Anthony: "This is a matter of life and death to us all. It may be said: Why is it so terrible to nationalize a company? It was done here. That is perfectly true, but it was done ... to our own British industry. Colonel Nasser's action is entirely different. He has taken over the international company without consultation and without consent.

"Some people say Colonel Nasser has promised not to interfere with shipping passing through the canal. Why therefore don't we trust him? The answer is simple: look at his record. Our quarrel is not with Egypt, still less with the Arab world. It is with Colonel Nasser.

"When he obtained power in Egypt, we felt no hostility towards him. On the contrary, we made agreements with him . . . Instead of meeting us with friendship, Colonel Nasser has conducted a vicious propaganda campaign against our country . . . And now he has torn up all his country's promises toward the Suez Canal Company . . . The pattern is familiar to many of us, my friends. We all know it is how fascist governments behave, and we all remember only too well what the cost can be in giving in to fascism. We do not seek a solution by force . . . But this I must make plain: we cannot agree that an act of plunder which threatens the livelihood of many nations shall be allowed to succeed."