Nation: TO GOVERN IS TO CHOOSE

In a direct and forceful message to the Senate President Kennedy last week urged ratification of the newly signed test ban agreement. Excerpts:

THIS treaty is the first concrete result of 18 years of effort by the United States to impose limits on the nuclear arms race. There is hope that it may lead to further measures to arrest and control the dangerous competition for increasingly destructive weapons.

This treaty is the whole agreement. United States negotiators in Moscow were instructed not to make this agreement conditioned upon any other understanding; and they made none. The treaty speaks for itself.

What It Does & Doesn't. This treaty advances, though it does not assure world peace; and it will inhibit, though it does not prohibit, the nuclear arms race. While it does not prohibit the United States and the Soviet Union from engaging in all nuclear tests, it will radically limit the testing in which both nations would otherwise engage. While it will not end the threat of nuclear war or outlaw the use of nuclear weapons, it can reduce world tensions, open a way to further agreements and thereby help to ease the threat of war. While it cannot wholly prevent the spread of nuclear arms to nations not now possessing them, it prohibits assistance to testing in these environments by others; it will be signed by many other potential testers; and it is thus an important opening wedge in our effort to "get the genie back in the bottle."

This treaty protects our rights in the future, be amended without the consent of the United States, and any party to the treaty has the right to withdraw upon three months' notice.

This treaty does not alter the status of unrecognized regimes Our adherence to this treaty can in no way accord or even imply recognition by the United States or any other nation of any regime which is not now accorded such recognition.

This treaty does not halt American nuclear progress. Our atomic laboratories will maintain an active development program, including underground testing, and we will be ready to resume testing in the atmosphere if necessary.

This treaty is not a substitute for, and does not diminish the need for continued Western and American military strength to meet all contingencies. It will not prevent us from building all the strength that we need.

Gains Offset the Risks. This treaty will assure the security of the United States better than continued unlimited testing on both sides. According to a comprehensive report prepared by responsible agencies government for the National Security Council the tests conducted by both the Soviet Union and the U.S. since President Eisenhower first proposed this kind of treaty in 1959 have not resulted in any substantial alteration in the strategic balance. Under this treaty, any gains in nuclear strength and knowledge which could be made by the tests of any other power—including not only underground tests, but even any illegal tests which might escape detection—could not be sufficient to offset the ability of our strategic forces to deter or survive a nuclear attack and to penetrate and destroy the aggressor's homeland. On the other hand, unrestricted testing —by which other powers could develop all kinds of weapons through atmospheric tests more cheaply an. quickly than they could underground—might well lead to a weakening of our security.