LAOS: Four Phases to Nonexistence

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Phase Two: Move to the Right. This surge of Communist power alarmed the Eisenhower Administration, then engaged in trying to help President Ngo Dinh Diem of neighboring South Viet Nam preserve a pro-Western government against Red aggression. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had tried to seal off Southeast Asia by building the SEATO pact and encouraging anti-Communist allies. The U.S. Ambassador to Laos, J. Graham Parsons, distrusted Premier Souvanna Phouma both as a neutralist and a compromiser with the Reds. Withholding U.S. economic aid was enough to cause Souvanna's downfall, and he was replaced by a pro-Western Premier. A U.S. military in mission was invited to Laos, and hard-working CIA men soon discovered in right-wing General Phoumi Nosavan a dedicated anti-Communist who displayed more signs of organizing ability and drive than most Laotians.

Phoumi Nosavan set up a militant, conservative party, and Red Prince Souphanouvong was jailed for treason. Iri the rigged national elections of 1960, Phoumi's group gained a sweeping majority. On the surface, a relatively tough U.S. policy of containing Communism seemed to be an overwhelming success.

But some $250 million in U.S. economic and military aid had too heady an effect on the Laotian government, which was soon reeling with corruption. Promised reforms never materialized, and practically no funds reached the peasants and forest tribes. The Communist Pathet Lao guerrilla bands began raiding in the north. Red Prince Souphanouvong not only walked out of jail, but took most of his prison guards with him. In August 1960, an obscure paratroop captain named Kong Le staged a military coup in Vientiane and returned Souvanna Phouma to power as Premier. General Phoumi Nosavan, with his CIA advisers, retreated to his southern stronghold of Savannakhet.

Phase Three: Right Defeated. At this point, the State Department, on the advice of new U.S. Ambassador Winthrop Brown, just about concluded that Laos could only be kept from continual eruption by working toward a coalition of the opposing forces in the country. But the CIA and the U.S. military mission in the field disagreed, opposed dealing with any Laotian leader who seemed soft on Communism. They argued that the U.S.-trained and equipped Royal Laotian Army of 28,000 men under General Phoumi was the only bulwark against a Red takeover. The Pentagon generally backed the CIA, but with the proviso that, under no conditions, should U.S. armed forces be plunged into the landlocked, trackless jungles of Laos.

With U.S. encouragement, Phoumi Nosavan in December 1960 launched a northward drive against Kong Le's paratroop battalion in Vientiane. It was about the only victory Phoumi Nosavan had ever won. Kong Le retreated to the strategic Plaine des Jarres, joining forces with the Pathet Lao. The Soviet Union poured in supplies by air, and Communist North Viet Nam contributed tough guerrilla cadres. When Phoumi's army advanced, it was badly beaten in a series of noisy but largely bloodless battles. Phoumi got a breathing space when, in the spring of 1961, the government eagerly agreed to a ceasefire.