The War: A Time for Patience & Resolve

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While South Viet Nam struggled through the sixth week of its deepest political trauma since the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem 2½ years ago, Washington could only watch, agonize and pray. In all the crises that have faced the U.S. since its postwar emergence as the free world's greatest power, there had never been a more sobering reminder of the limitations of American might within the self-imposed limitations of American foreign policy. As the principal guarantor of South Viet Nam's independence, the U.S. could do little but wait patiently in the wings while its ally played out a perilous drama that clearly endangered both nations' most cherished aims.

This was no easy exercise, particularly for an Administration that prizes pragmatism above all. It had nonetheless succeeded so far. By week's end, at least, near-anarchy had been succeeded by a tenuous accord in Saigon. The Military Directory, headed by Premier Nguyen Cao Ky, had survived, but with lost face and a doubtful future. The U.S. would still be dealing with the Directory as it prepared to hold elections to give the country a civilian government. But Washington would have to pay increasing attention to Tri Quang, the infrangible Buddhist prelate who had emerged as the country's most astute and powerful politician (see THE WORLD).

No Chances. In the weeks of internecine squabbling, the allies had clearly lost their gathering momentum both on the military front and in the drive to bring social and economic reform to the villages. As for the hard battlefield cost, opinion was divided. Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp Jr., the U.S. Pacific commander, thought that in spite of the turmoil, "we are doing quite well." Less sanguine officers closer to the conflict noted a sharp drop in South Vietnamese operations. One result was that for the first time in the war, U.S. combat deaths for a one-week period (ending April 9) outnumbered South Vietnamese 95 to 67; and for the first 99 days of the year, the U.S. lost 1,361 men, 19 more than in all of 1965.

Once reasonable political stability has been restored, the allies will face the task of convincing the Communist insurgents that they have had only a brief reprieve in a war that the U.S. intends to fight to the last paddyfield.

Though Lyndon Johnson was hopeful that the worst of the crisis was over—and in fact took off for a tumultuous visit to Mexico City in order to demonstrate his detachment—Washington was taking no chances. In a carefully worded, 15-page "working paper," White House and State Department experts listed a number of possibilities ranging in outlook from high optimism to bone-deep pessimism. The least acceptable contingency was the prospect of a neutralist regime in Saigon that would either demand outright U.S. withdrawal or impose such humiliating restrictions as to make a pullout unavoidable.

Honed Swords. Some of the Administration's more persistent critics have leaped with gloomy relish on this prospect. Administration officials argue that however bitterly the Vietnamese may differ on every other issue, the nation is united by a "common opposition to control by Hanoi." That alone, they reason, should ensure a continued U.S. presence.