World: SOUTH AMERICA: ARMIES IN COMMAND

SOUTH AMERICA'S present political plight can be summed up in one stark statistic: three out of every four of the continent's citizens now live under military regimes of one form or another. That ratio was created by the imposition two weeks ago of overt military rule in Brazil, where half the continent's 180 million people live. Yet even before that event, armed forces were in command in four other im portant countries—Argentina, Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay—which stretch from the peaks of the Andes to the desolate plains of Tierra del Fuego.

Since 1930, South America has been shaken by 39 military coups, affecting all but one (Uruguay) of the continent's ten principal countries. But the new set of coups is significantly different. Though there were some exceptions, by and large the military men in the past were eager to return to their barracks. After, of course, they had replaced the civilian regime that they had ousted with one more to their taste. Increasingly, the more recent military leaders do not share that retiring attitude. Confident and cocky activists, they intend to hold on to the power they seize in order to lead their countries themselves. For better or worse, South America's political destiny rests more and more in the hands of a new kind of soldier turned national administrator.

A Better Job. In a sense, the South American military can hardly be blamed for seeking to exercise political power. After all, they otherwise would have almost nothing to do. Their countries are not in danger either from outside attacks or surprise raids by neighbors. Yet the continent's nations keep nearly 600,000 men on active duty and spend more money ($1 billion a year) on military costs and armaments, including French-built Mirage supersonic jet fighters, than they receive from the U.S. under the Alliance for Progress and other aid programs ($776 million).

In South America, however, military hardware has uses other than defense. It affords armies an undisputed strength at home that makes them the continent's most effective political force. In the present circumstances, the vast majority of the officers feel that the armies need ail the strength they can get. Though Fidel Castro is not their idol, South American youths, who represent by far the fastest-growing segment of the population, are swinging ever more to the left. The officers, who mostly embody conservative, lower-middle-class views, hope to arrest that movement with tough government action. They are also thoroughly disgusted with civilian politicians, who have failed to cope with the urgent problems of their countries. Trained in their own staff col leges or U.S. military schools, the officers, especially the younger ones, feel that they can do a better job.

If they reach that conclusion, South American officers are not bound by the strict moral prohibition against interfering in politics that would inhibit Anglo-Saxon military men. As a result of a legacy that dates back to the military's role in liberating the continent from Spain in the 1800s and to its subsequent support for social reform, the officers consider themselves the saviors and protectors of their countries' wellbeing. If the exercise of this lofty mission entails tossing a few politicians out of office, the military conscience remains untwinged.