Nation: Behind the Points in Paris

NOW that all sides in Viet Nam seem willing to relinquish rhetorical pronunciamentos for real bargaining, the distances separating the adversaries on specific issues can begin to be measured. There is no substantial gap—in principle at least—on a number of items. On others, grave differences and difficulties remain.

The U.S. and the Communists agree to respect the territorial integrity of Laos and Cambodia. They are willing to negotiate a prisoner exchange. Both say that the entire political spectrum of South Viet Nam must be eligible for representation in its government. The U.S. insisted for years that the National Liberation Front be excluded, but Washington has since surrendered that position. Use of an international supervisory group to help carry out peace terms is recommended by both sides, for different purposes. Hanoi still proposes the reunification of North and South, less adamantly than it used to, and the U.S. now accepts the possibility—although the means to bring that about remain vague for now. Last week, reversing a long-held stand, President Nixon conceded that the U.S. would be willing to participate in discussions of political questions between the N.L.F. and the Saigon government. Previously, the U.S. had sought to negotiate only military matters, and only with North Viet Nam, while South Vietnamese alone dealt with internal questions.

Because the same word means different things to each side, agreement can be more apparent than real. Both sides talk about a "neutral" South Viet Nam, for instance. To the Communists, this may mean the exclusion from government of any element that fought them. "Democracy" has different definitions for Asians and Americans, for Communists and nonCommunists.

Genuine differences exist over the key question of withdrawal of non-South Vietnamese forces. The N.L.F. and Hanoi demand unconditional evacuation of U.S. and allied troops with international supervision of the exodus. Washington wants joint withdrawal of U.S., allied and North Vietnamese troops with outside monitoring. While the N.L.F. tacitly acknowledges the presence of North Vietnamese forces south of the DMZ, the latest Communist plan merely proposes that the matter of "Vietnamese" military forces in South Viet Nam should be negotiated "by the Vietnamese parties among themselves." The N.L.F. hinted, however, that it might be willing to ask North Vietnamese troops to withdraw from South Viet Nam if the U.S. pulls out at the same time.

Richard Nixon could agree to this if means existed to assure compliance. He changed the position set out after Lyndon Johnson's October, 1966 meeting with Asian leaders; the Manila communique ruled out allied withdrawals before "the level of violence subsides," and declared that those troops would be fully evacuated within six months after the North Vietnamese had left. Once both sides agreed, said Nixon, the majority of "non-South Vietnamese forces"—a delicate locution that takes in the North Vietnamese without pointing the propagandist's finger at them—would be withdrawn from South Viet Nam over a twelve-month period. Thereafter, the remaining non-South Vietnamese forces would withdraw into enclaves, cease fighting and eventually quit the country entirely.