WHAT WITHDRAWAL WOULD REALLY MEAN

AS the Moratorium showed, the call is growing for immediate and unconditional U.S. withdrawal from Viet Nam. For a good many, "immediate" means by the end of 1970, as specified in the bill sponsored by New York's Senator Charles E. Goodell. Other Moratorium supporters or sympathizers would not necessarily go that far—at least not yet. Actually, more significant than a deadline is the demand for a public commitment that U.S. forces will be totally withdrawn regardless of progress in Saigon or any other factor. The demand for such a withdrawal has increased significantly. In the words of one Rand expert, "Unilateral withdrawal is now respectable." It seems like such a tempting idea to a great many people, so inviting an end to what has become a national nightmare, that the case needs to be reexamined.

The Case for a Pullout

The argument for immediate withdrawal comes in many forms. To some of its advocates, a kind of moral imperative is involved—the war is evil, the U.S. has no right to be in Viet Nam, the Saigon government is rotten and without popular support, etc.

In its more reasoned and restrained Version, however, the argument is persuasive. It goes something like this: The U.S. is pledged to leave anyway. It would indeed be useful if, before departing, the U.S. were to ensure a more or less independent South, but that is a hopeless task—the Saigon regime will not be able to stand on its own for many years to come, if ever. Certainly it will not do so while it can rely on the American presence to prop it up. "Vietnamization" is a sham, .or at least so poor a bet that it does not justify the continued war effort.

True, it might be useful for the U.S. to delay its departure, or make it gradual, even if at the end of two or three years the Saigon government were to fall, because the delay would cushion the blow to U.S. prestige and would give the U.S. time to shore up its positions elsewhere. But that advantage is not worth the cost—in lives, in money, and in domestic discord. Bitterness at home is likely to grow so severe, if the war is continued even at a relatively low level, that the U.S. system itself is likely to be seriously impaired. Besides, the longer the war lasts, the stronger will be the sentiment for "No More Viet Nams"—a new isolationism that will cripple future U.S. policy in the world.

The only way out of the Viet Nam impasse, the argument continues, was demonstrated by Charles de Gaulle, who firmly liquidated the French commitment in Algeria, despite all earlier pledges to the contrary. The result was a massive exodus of Frenchmen from Algeria and a temporary loss of national prestige; eventually, though, De Gaulle extricated France from an overwhelming financial and moral burden. In much the same way, a unilateral withdrawal from Viet Nam would free the U.S. from an impossible situation. A frank acceptance of defeat would clear the air, gain America credit for moral courage, and enable the U.S. to start working on a rational foreign policy beyond Viet Nam. "The extent of the cost of the withdrawal has been vastly overstated," says former Under Secretary of State George Ball, who feels that other countries do not regard the war as being in the U.S. national interest. They will have more respect for U.S. judgment if it gets out.