The Nation: No Decent Exit from Viet Nam for the U.S

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ONE of the highest priorities of the Nixon Administration has always been the search for what one of its officials calls "a decent exit" from Viet Nam. Washington had hoped that next month's presidential election in that country would have provided such an avenue. A hard-fought campaign and honest balloting could have signified a long step toward open and competitive democracy, vindicating Nixon's policy of Vietnamization and justifying a stepped-up U.S. withdrawal. But last week President Nguyen Van Thieu killed any lingering hopes for such a success. By ordering opponent Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky's name off the ballot, he turned the election into an all but meaningless referendum on his own performance in office (see THE WORLD). In Washington, Administration leaders were utterly dejected. "To say that we're disappointed gets nowhere near the depth of it," said one. "It's a goddam mess and we can't see our way out."

The election became a farce largely because Thieu would brook no opposition. Also the principals, with the possible exception of General Duong Van Minh, who withdrew earlier, maneuvered coldly in pursuit of their private ambitions. Although self-seeking might well be considered a universal disease of politicians, the candidates' actions, judged by Washington logic, made little sense. "It was in their interest, even more than in ours, to have this election go off well," complained a frustrated U.S. diplomat. "We needed it, of course, to help justify our policies. But it is their country. They needed it even more." That sentiment was echoed by a South Vietnamese official: "By using force, President Thieu can run alone. He will win, of course. But it will not solve the problems of our country. It will only make them worse."

Coup Attempt. The U.S. had hoped that it would be obvious to the South Vietnamese that a fair and vigorously contested election would knock down Hanoi's persistent charge that the Saigon government is a puppet of Washington. A willingness to allow diverse elements to compete for governmental power might also have convinced Hanoi that the time had come to negotiate seriously for a peace settlement. But as Thieu reaches for greater power by grasping all available governmental levers, dissidence grows, the possibility of a military coup becomes more real, and Hanoi may be tempted to continue to stall. Saigon could even return to the chaotic days of revolving governments that followed the overthrow and assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. And that would almost certainly shred any remnants of U.S. sympathy with the Viet Nam involvement.