Books: Musical Flags

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Behn believed he could contribute to international understanding by constructing global telephone links. Central to ITT's European operations was a German holding company established in 1930. It was inevitable that Behn would have to do business with Hitler. "In trying to hold his system together," writes Sampson, "Behn gradually wove a web of corruption and compromise which left the idealism in ruins." From documents he found in U.S. archives, Sampson concludes that Behn cooperated willingly with the Nazis, choosing not to repatriate his German profits and agreeing to his German subsidiary's purchase of an interest in Focke-Wulf, the aircraft company. It is only fair to say that ITT denies Sampson's interpretation, arguing that foreign-owned companies in Nazi Germany were not allowed to send their profits home. Compensation was another story, however. When Nazi-controlled Rumania threatened to expropriate ITT's phone system, Behn cannily negotiated a sale of the besieged assets for $13.8 million.

No Surprises. In 1959, two years after Behn's death, the leadership of ITT passed to Harold S. Geneen, a small, owlish man who was trained in accountancy, and seems to prefer hamburgers to French cuisine. Even so, Geneen cannot resist comparing himself to Behn: "He was a man of his time; I am a man of my time." Born in Britain 63 years ago, Geneen came to the U.S. at the age of one. A wizard with figures, Geneen began his career as a New York Stock Exchange page and rose from accountant to executive positions in such companies as Bell & Howell, Jones & Laughlin and Raytheon.

Under Geneen, ITT has come to own some 260 companies in 86 countries. Crucial to his management is a system that can keep executives at meetings for up to ten days a month. The system is designed to avoid surprises. Ironically but predictably, the vaunted "no surprise" system produced shocks on the political front. Predictably, because most men who are trained to think in quantitative terms are insensitive to nuance and subtlety. Sampson fails to stress this inherent characteristic of business bureaucracies. He also fails to meet the challenge of Geneen's complex personality and conflicting drives.

In some ways, Geneen is close to genius: the management method he has imposed on ITT disciplines and tames territorial chieftains who might otherwise rebel and enables him to check the performance of a widely—almost wildly—diversified company. In other ways Geneen is a gambler on a monumental scale. Sampson neglects this facet of Geneen, although he does show that when Geneen acquired Hartford Insurance he knew full well that the antitrust division of the Justice Department would oppose him. In short, Sampson concludes, Geneen was under the utmost compulsion to try to change the trustbusters' collective mind.