Nation: The Mid East: Search for Stability

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Armed intervention was also overwhelmingly opposed in the State Department as being far more diplomatically damaging than the shoring up of Hussein would have been worth. Hussein's own role as a moderating influence in the Arab world would have been fatally impaired if he could be sustained only at the point of U.S. bayonets. The U.S. too would have lost its capacity for any kind of mediating role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Reaction at home would have been overwhelmingly adverse. As Nixon told a White House visitor on Tuesday: "The American people do not have the heart to go into another war." Finally, an armed expedition could have resulted in the execution of the hijack hostages and reprisals against other Americans in Jordan.

As the crisis unfolded, Nixon made no attempt to seek the advice of Congressmen on what to do. He did brief legislators in the course of previously scheduled meetings, but refused comment on his plans. Nevertheless, all came away convinced that he was not going to throw troops into Jordan. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright had some rare kind words for the Administration. "I have been very encouraged," he said. "They are trying to do the right thing."

Fruitless Wrangling

Publicly, however, the Administration continued to sound belligerent and to apply diplomatic pressure as the Syrian armor found the Jordanian resistance brutally tough but did not pull back. At the U.N., the U.S. shunned a British and French effort to seek a four-power declaration urging an end to the fighting, fearing that it would only lead to fruitless wrangling.

In Washington, Yuly M. Vorontsov, the chargé d'affaires of the Russian embassy, was a frequent visitor in the office of State's Sisco. Their exchange amounted, in essence, to the U.S.'s urging the Russians to get the Syrians to withdraw their tanks, while the U.S.S.R. warned the U.S. to stay out and to keep Israel out. Kissinger even attended an official Egyptian social affair on Tuesday night, where Vorontsov loudly demanded to know why the U.S. had not responded to the Soviet note. While enthralled guests stared, Kissinger was overheard to say that there was no need for a reply because "our friends haven't done anything." Would the U.S. be satisfied if the Syrian tanks stopped advancing? No, replied Kissinger; they must withdraw.

They did turn back on the very next day, though U.S. pressure was probably not the major reason. The most significant cause seemed to be the devastating counterattack launched by the Jordanian troops and aircraft (see THE WORLD). The threat of a flanking Israeli attack also worried the Syrians. The failure of Iraq to join them hurt too. Yet it was also likely, as one White House official claimed, that "the threat of intervention helped to stabilize the situation."

It probably did, although there was considerable bluff in all of the saber-rattling, and that game is risky. At best, it can rarely work more than once. At worst, it can be called. If Hussein's army had been beaten and the U.S. had not intervened, the show of force would have been revealed as only a show—and the U.S. would have looked far weaker than before.