Nation: The Mid East: Search for Stability

• Share

(6 of 10)

The precise role of the Russians was difficult to define. It seemed impossible that Moscow, which has advisers throughout the Syrian army, was unaware of Damascus' intention to invade. The Russians may not have known the extent of the thrust, however, Moscow made every public pose of trying to check the fighting. Yet some U.S. analysts speculated that the Russians might have been playing a clever double role: instructing their advisers with the Syrian army to let the tanks roll, but to appear as the peace saver by pulling them back if they failed. It was not necessarily that the Soviets wanted Hussein to fall, but rather that they did not want the guerrillas crushed. It appeared that the Russians in the end became more concerned with restoring a measure of stability than making minor gains in influence at the expense of the pro-Western King.

Nixon thinks in less kindly terms about the two superpowers' roles in the Middle East. He is known to believe that while the U.S. seeks peace there, Russia wants control. But there is a common interest—preventing the smaller countries from pulling Moscow and Washington into a major confrontation. His tactic throughout the hair-raising week, he said, was to "show great power but also to show great restraint."

With a display of muscle, a guarding of his options and, in the end, a shunning of any actual application of force, Nixon had managed to preserve at least some hope of peacemaking in the Middle East and elsewhere. Hussein was temporarily sustained as his troops routed the Syrians and inflicted heavy casualties on the commandos. Yet those very casualties only inflamed the bitterness of the commandos. To shore up his military position, the U.S. now plans to resume military assistance to Amman. Desperately trying for a measure of stability in the area, the U.S. feels that Hussein is far preferable to a radical guerrilla regime in Jordan.

Negotiation Prospects

What happens next in the larger Arab-Israeli deadlock is the top priority question now preoccupying Washington. Despite all of the new tensions—or perhaps because of them—the Rogers peace initiative is still alive—barely. While it seemed to founder on the failure of the U.S. to prevent Soviet duplicity in Egypt, it is now a matter of even more urgency. The plan has at least led to a cease-fire along the Suez. Both sides have agreed at least in principle to renewed talks.

The formula, as U.S. diplomats read it, is still sound. It demands that Israel give up some or most of its occupied territories, that Arabs respect Israel's legitimacy and frontiers; that Israel be able to count on the ability of the Arab governments to live up to agreements, as well as on the commitment of the U.S. to guarantee them. Israel must also be able to believe that Russia will no longer connive with Arabs in a way that endangers Israeli security. What happened in Jordan and along the Suez makes such trust more difficult than ever to establish.