SPECIAL SECTION: A Guide to Nixon's China Journey

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The Chinese are clearly going out of their way to make Nixon's visit pleasant and untroubled. On the eve of the journey, China is undergoing a great wave of repainting, face scrubbing and sign switching. Slogans referring bluntly to "U.S. imperialists and their running dogs" have been replaced by blander remarks about "the unity of the world's peoples." In some cases, however, it is impossible to tell whether the bustle is caused solely by the impending visit. Since Nixon will reach Peking only six days after the start of China's New Year, a traditional cleanup time, much of the activity is undoubtedly in honor of the Year of the Rat.

Despite the enormous publicity buildup for the Peking summit, both sides have cautioned against expecting too much to come from it. Practically speaking, the White House hopes to achieve a few small substantive gains and does not expect anything large or sensational. The central objective is to establish a permanent channel for communications between Peking and Washington. An exchange of ambassadors is not likely until there is a solution of the Taiwan problem. But perhaps a hot line similar to the one that links Moscow and Washington might be installed between the two capitals.

During his two earlier visits to Peking, Kissinger worked out an agenda with Premier Chou En-lai for the talks, which will be held in secret. The meetings, probably daily ones with Chou and at least one with Mao, will cover a wide variety of topics, including the release of the remaining three American prisoners in China (likely, but later), an exchange of artists, athletes and journalists (almost certain), increases in trade (very likely, but limited) and landing rights for U.S. commercial airlines in China (maybe later). There will also be talks (probably inconclusive) about divided Korea, Sino-Soviet relations and the future relationships between the U.S. and China in Asia. Still another subject for discussion is the future of Taiwan. The U.S. will not, of course, abandon its treaty agreements with the island republic. But Washington has finally accepted Peking's position that the future of Taiwan is essentially an internal Chinese problem, to be worked out by Peking and Taipei. Peking seems to accept the logic of the U.S. position that it cannot sever its commitment to Taiwan until Peking and Taipei work out a settlement.

Big Impact. Repeatedly, Nixon and Kissinger have stressed that no deals affecting third countries will be made in Peking. That applies only in a limited sense. To be sure, the Indochina war will not be settled in Peking. China lacks both the inclination and the influence to force a settlement on Hanoi. In a broader sense, however, a Sino-American understanding about the future of the war and of Southeast

Asia would have great impact. If, for example, Washington and Peking threw their support behind Malaysia's call for the neutralization of Southeast Asia, they might conceivably become the joint guarantors of the area's security against potential Soviet incursions.