At War with War

(8 of 10)

All through the week reports surfaced that communications within the Administration are only somewhat better than Nixon's relations with the young. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird admitted to reporters that he had not even been aware that the U.S. had made four, not three air strikes over North Viet Nam. The raids were styled "reinforced protective reaction" —a phrase which itself represents a style of noncommunication.

As the Pentagon tried to paper over that lapse, it also had to contend with stories that Laird, like Secretary of State William Rogers, had opposed the Cambodia decision. Laird denied it as vigorously as he could, and his denial was technically accurate. In fact, Laird had serious reservations about the move. Rather than disagree directly, he stressed arguments about the negative political repercussions that would follow. All along Laird has been particularly sensitive to the opposition's mood—more so, it seems, than has the President.

Rogers was put in a position that was at best embarrassing and at worst untenable. Last week portions of Rogers' April 23 testimony before a House appropriations subcommittee were leaked to the press. In that appearance, less than a week before Nixon ordered Americans into Cambodia, Rogers stated flatly: "We recognize that if we get involved in Cambodia with our ground forces, our whole program is defeated." Then he added: "I think the one lesson that the war in Viet Nam has taught us is that if you are going to fight a war of this kind satisfactorily, you need public support and congressional support." After the Cambodian attack became known, Democratic Representative Clarence Long said: "If I were Rogers, I would resign."

Henry Kissinger was also said to have dissented and took pains to deny the rumor. Last week a group of Kissinger's old Harvard colleagues, including Edwin Reischauer and Adam Yarmolinsky, told him in effect that unless the Administration's policies change, or Kissinger resigns, he will not be welcome back at Harvard. Kissinger listened to the message, then told his friends quietly: "I want you to understand that I hear you."

Congressional Conflict

The distinction between Congress' power to declare war and the President's ability to wage war on his own has been a historic source of controversy. By one count, U.S. Presidents ordered undeclared acts of war 149 times up to World War II. The list begins with the hostilities between France and the U.S. in 1798: as another example, Thomas Jefferson informed Congress months after he had ordered a small squadron of frigates into the Mediterranean in 1801 to protect U.S. shipping from the Barbary states.