THE PRESIDENCY: Richard Nixon Stumbles to the Brink

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More threatening to the President, however, is the specter of impeachment. Nixon's actions almost certainly killed chances of a quick confirmation by the Congress of House Republican Leader Gerald Ford as Vice President. The appointment had been seen by many as another attempt by Nixon to placate the Congress by elevating one of its own. Now the Senate would almost certainly delay, waiting for a determination of Nixon's own fate.

The climactic weekend had its origins in events that slowly increased in pace from the beginning of the week.

Even before the court of appeals handed down its ruling, it had urged Cox and Nixon's attorneys to try to reach some kind of agreement that would enable the critical evidence to go to the grand jury without forcing a legal showdown over separation of powers. Cox and the President's counsel, Fred Buzhardt, had met for many hours before advising the court that they could not find a mutually acceptable means to do this. Last week Richardson, at the behest of Nixon through his aide Alexander Haig, reopened talks with Cox.

A White House official conceded that such talk had influenced Nixon to make his move. Nixon, almost totally preoccupied with the crisis in the Middle East, undoubtedly felt the burden of the Watergate suspicions and litigation more keenly than ever. As Senator Baker put it: "You can only be nibbled by so many ducks at a time." Perhaps he even saw the war as a propitious time to try to get rid of Watergate once and for all.

On Monday, members of the Cox staff got a hint at what was up when he asked key men: "What would you think of John Stennis as referee in the tapes dispute?" Whatever position each staff man took, Cox assumed an opposite stance, provoking discussion. By Tuesday, Cox and his staff had reached a consensus: the issue was not really whether Stennis was the right man; the whole procedure was wrong. No court would accept summaries of tapes as evidence. Any judge would insist on the tapes.

By Wednesday, the Cox team had thoroughly studied a three-page proposal written by Richardson. It suggested that Nixon appoint a "verifier" of the tapes, an individual of "wide experience, strong character and established reputation for veracity." He would be given the tapes "for as long as he considered necessary," as well as a transcript of the tapes that would omit portions that "were not pertinent." His job would be to play the tapes and correct the transcript as needed. He could paraphrase any "embarrassing" language—an apparent reference to Nixon's propensity for coarse phrases. This verifier could also delete references harmful to "national defense or foreign relations."

The Richardson plan then called for the finished transcript to be submitted to the courts, which would be asked to accept the whole procedure. Accompanying the verified documents would be sworn affidavits that the tapes had not been altered in any way. The President's outside expert, University of Texas Law Professor Charles Wright, had meanwhile been summoned from Texas to Washington, and was reportedly astonished that Nixon was willing to yield to the extent that he would allow outside examination of the tapes.