Nation: A Sudden Vision of Peace

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for all mankind." Turning to Sadat, Begin recounted how they had become friends on first meeting, when Sadat made his historic visit to Jerusalem last November. Begin alluded to the difficulties (largely of his making) that had brought all progress to a halt in the intervening months, but waved them away, saying "Everything belongs to the past." He said he and Sadat were friends anew, and as a now smiling Sadat nodded in vigorous assent, he challenged Sadat and himself to sign their peace treaty even before the three-month deadline. Finished, Begin rose to embrace Carter. Then, in an emotional piece of theater as telling as anything the three men had said, Begin walked behind Carter to Sadat and the two men embraced, not once but twice. Not since Sadat had stepped from his plane into the klieg lights at Tel Aviv airport ten months ago had peace in the Middle East seemed so palpably possible.

Which is not to say it is at hand, for all the promise the Camp David agreements hold out. The aim at the summit was to reach some accord on questions that have blocked an Arab-Israeli peace settlement since the 1967 war: How is Israeli security to be assured? Who has sovereignty over the Jordan River's West Bank? What will be the status of the Palestinians? Carter Administration officials praised the dual agreement as marking the first time that a framework has been created to deal with the three fundamental issues that have prevented settlement: peace, Israeli withdrawal and security, and the Palestinians. But they readily acknowledge that some of the thorniest issues have been left for future resolution, as an analysis of the two agreements shows. Both are indeed frameworks, carefully and even ingeniously latticed in places, gapingly unfinished in others. A précis of each:

Framework for a Peace in the Middle East is designed to permit the progressive resolution of the Palestinian issue over the next five years—the transition period that Israel and Egypt agreed should precede the actual signing of a peace treaty for the entire area. The negotiations during the interim period are meant to enable the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, who are mostly Palestinians, to obtain full autonomy and self-government at the end of the five years. Ideally, those negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians living in the occupied lands, and will conclude with, among other things, a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. But getting Jordan and the Palestinians to participate in those negotiations may be no easy task, particularly since the agreement leaves it to the negotiations to determine the exact nature of the sovereignty of Gaza and the West Bank. Of help will be the fact that Israel has agreed that the settlement will be based on all the provisions and principles of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which calls for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied during the 1967 war. That is a major Israeli concession: the West Bank and Gaza are among those territories.

In return, Israel will be permitted to maintain a military presence at specific locations in the occupied lands, during the transition, to ensure its security, and there are further, detailed provisions for demilitarized zones, early warning stations, an international (meaning U.N.) peacekeeping force, and the gradual creation of local police forces.