ENERGY: Atomic Dilemma

Should the U.S. freely sell peaceful nuclear technology abroad? The question is so important that it is being more and more debated at the highest levels of the Federal Government. On the one hand, the nation's overseas sales of atomic power plants, equipment and services swell U.S. export earnings by a cool $1.5 billion a year. On the other, the proliferation of nuclear reactors can also lead to the spread of nuclear weapons—meaning atom bombs.

Last week the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission opened the debate to the public for the first time. Its concern was anything but academic, since it has to decide whether to approve a license to export 12,261 kg. of Government-owned enriched uranium to fuel a reactor in India. In 1974 Indian scientists used fissionable materials, taken from a Canadian reactor, to build what they called a "peaceful nuclear device." After the bomb was exploded, Canada shut off nuclear aid to India. To keep the U.S. from following suit, the Indian government pledged to use American materials exclusively in its civilian reactors. The Natural Resources Defense Council, a U.S. environmental-law group, worried nonetheless about India's capacity to create more A-bombs and asked the NRC to stop the uranium sale. In response, the NRC's commissioners decided to hold two days of hearings in Washington.

The debate was often blunt. Herbert Scoville Jr., a former assistant director of the federal Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, testified: "To continue to guarantee the supply of nuclear fuel to a nation that has demonstrated its intention to acquire nuclear weapons is to send the wrong signal to the rest of the world." He and other opponents of the sale want the U.S. to use enriched uranium—the nation is still the world's largest supplier—to demand concessions. As one condition of sale, for example, India might be required to sign the nonproliferation treaty of 1968.

Reliable Supplier. Unfortunately, the issue is not so simple, said Myron B. Kratzer, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. If the U.S. withholds the uranium, India could buy fuel elsewhere—probably from the U.S.S.R. The Indians might then also refuse to allow international inspectors to monitor their reactors. That would remove the only existing outside control over India's nuclear activities. Therefore, Kratzer continued, the U.S.'s best position involves a paradox. The nation can watch over the proliferation of atomic weapons only if it remains actively engaged as a reliable supplier of peaceful nuclear needs.