DIPLOMACY: From Geneva Up to Geneva Down

• Share

Why were these men smiling?

Israeli Premier Menachem Begin was burbling with good humor at the end of his three-day official visit to Washington last week. His talks, he said, had produced a chance to establish "real peace" after "the delay of almost a generation." President Carter seemed almost equally optimistic. "I believe we have laid the groundwork now," he said, "and barring some unforeseen difficulties, that will lead to the Geneva Conference in October." He also suggested that such a conference could well lead to eventual compromise. "We've not found any of them to be so adamant in their positions that they are not eager for accommodation."

But some senior Administration officials failed to see any sound reason for such optimism—except public relations. A Geneva Conference by October is far from certain, and even if it does convene, it is virtually inconceivable that it would lead to a settlement in the foreseeable future. Privately, Carter and his aides conceded that they were discouraged by the gulf that exists between the Israeli position and the Arabs'—though they should hardly have been surprised.

New Assistance. On balance. Begin had a lot more to smile about than Carter. He proved himself a charming, highly skillful diplomat—personally far more appealing than his stiff predecessor Yitzhak Rabin and perhaps even Earth Mother Golda Meir. He engaged in a sort of love feast with the President and returned to Israel with new military assistance. Only a few weeks ago, Washington was issuing stern warnings to Begin that he must be flexible. What had happened?

Ever since his meeting with U.S. Jewish leaders (TIME, July 18), Carter had softened his attitude toward Israel without technically changing his position. Example: lately there has not been any mention of a "homeland" for Palestinians but instead reference to a Palestinian region tied to Jordan. He obviously wanted to avoid a meeting with Begin that ended in open disagreement. Besides, recalling Carter's earlier disastrous encounter with Rabin, one official explained, "Carter must have realized that his tough attitude toward Rabin did not pay off. Instead of movement, he got Israel to dig in its heels. Carter must have seen that to get the best results, he must play the pussycat—and he was the pussycat."

But what results Carter got, apart from a friendly atmosphere that might prove to be useful later, is not clear. As far as is known, Carter simply did not choose to press his earlier prescriptions for Israeli concessions, including the Palestinian homeland and substantial withdrawal from occupied territories to pre-1967 boundaries. Begin in turn sidestepped the thornier issues. He took the position that unlike his predecessor, he did not want to negotiate an agreement with the U.S. but simply wanted to get started negotiating directly with the Arabs. He talked lyrically of peace, without giving any sign that he was prepared for territorial concessions other than those his predecessors were prepared to make in Sinai and the Golan Heights. The push toward Geneva might buy him time, and, should the Arabs refuse the conference, it would place the onus of intransigence on them.