MIDDLE EAST: Sadat: The Hour of Decision

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In fact, Sadat by his visit had already split the Arab world, although it remained to be seen how deep and permanent that gap was. As for being in an "impossible position," that phrase was less applicable to Egypt than to the P.L.O., whose panicky leaders last week worried whether they might end up as the losers in the new Middle East diplomatic moves. Although Sadat spoke forthrightly to the Knesset about Palestinian rights to a homeland, never once did he mention the P.L.O.—which Arab leaders, at their 1974 Rabat summit, had designated as the sole legitimate representative ofthe Palestinian people.

Responding to sharp Palestinian criticism of his trip, Sadat on his return home shut down the Egyptian Voice of Palestine, a P.L.O. radio station, and expelled 20 Palestinians who had tried to organize demonstrations against his mission. He also arranged for Egypt's majority political group, the Arab Socialist Party, to invite leaders of Palestinian Arabs who live on the West Bank to Cairo for consultations about the resumption of Geneva talks. The invitation pointedly called on the Palestinian people "to differentiate between those who seek peace and those who want to destroy everything."

Privately, P.L.O. leaders conceded that without the united support of other Arab states, Sadat had the advantage. They feared that the Saudis and others might be prepared to jettison the Rabat agreement if a Geneva peace settlement could be worked out allowing some alternative arrangement involving Palestinians other than the P.L.O. One Fatah commander gloomily concluded that Egypt and Israel "have agreed to get rid of us by any means, without at least giving us back part of our land."

Before, during and after the visit, Sadat made it clear that a solution to the Palestinian problem was the key to any Middle East peace settlement. He had advised the Israelis not to be excessively legalistic in trying to veto whoever would represent the Palestinians at Geneva. His invitation to the West Bank leaders may also have been a warning to the P.L.O. to soften its anti-Israel stance in the interests of a greater good —a settlement that could lead to a Palestinian entity. Privately, some P.L.O. members thought that if the organization was being neglected by Arab moderates it had only itself to blame. Washington had stated that some gesture of recognition toward Israel could lead to dialogue. Overplaying its hand, the P.L.O. had refused to make any such gesture, thereby losing a golden opportunity to gain wider international recognition.