A War of Angry Cousins

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With so obvious a propaganda advantage, the Soviet Union at week's end had essentially limited its counterattack against China to a fusillade of words. Pravda ventilated Soviet "wrath and indignation" at the Chinese aggression. Without making a specific threat, Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov reaffirmed that the U.S.S.R. "will honor its obligations under the treaty of friendship and cooperation with Viet Nam." Official press and radio also charged the U.S. with connivance in the Chinese attack. Emphasizing that the Chinese invasion was launched "almost the next day" after Teng Hsiao-p'ing's return from Washington, Pravda protested that "no propaganda twists and turns will help cover up the responsibility of those circles in the U.S.A. that facilitated, directly or indirectly, Peking's actions." The attack on the U.S. was preposterous, but the Soviet ire was understandable and predictable. Nothing about the new U.S.-China relationship has pleased them.

As long as the Vietnamese forces can hold their own, the Soviets will probably prefer to reap the propaganda benefits of restraint. The danger is that if the Chinese were to press the war too far, moving against Hanoi or Haiphong or indicating an intention to stay on Vietnamese soil, the Soviets themselves would not want to appear weak and would feel compelled to act. If so, what would they do? Administration experts say the Soviet options are many. They could mount a major resupply of Vietnamese forces, dispatch large numbers of military advisers, or even take direct military action in Viet Nam.

More ominous, they could also threaten Peking's sense of security by moving along the 4,500-mile Soviet-Chinese border, which is bristling with 44 divisions of the Red Army. Soviet troops could strike into the frozen, inhospitable terrain of Sinkiang, but a more likely target is Manchuria, China's industrial heartland. Analysts hopefully discount an air attack on China's nuclear faculty at Lop Nor as a "doomsday" option, one perhaps favored by Moscow's military brass, but not by the Politburo.

The U.S. has been relegated to the role of sideline observer, without much influence on either combatant. The Administration's position was that the Chinese intrusion was a direct result of the Soviet-encouraged Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, which, in turn, was seen as Moscow's response to the normalization of

Chinese-American relations. U.S. policy was based on the notion that this country should not become involved in a conflict among far-off Communist states. Thus Washington evenhandedly urged Peking and Hanoi to withdraw their troops from both Viet Nam and Cambodia. Pursuing its honest-broker role, the U.S. also pressed for an urgent meeting of the United Nations' Security Council, hoping to rally enough votes for a resolution calling for reciprocal withdrawal.

In the opening debate Friday, U.S.