Nation: Carter Defuses a Crisis

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Carter's diplomatic moves will probably be more upsetting to the Soviets. Though the Administration officially denied that these actions were linked to the brigade, they were clearly a demonstration of Brzezinski's "principle of reciprocity"; that is, when the U.S.S.R. does something considered damaging to American interests, the U.S. will respond in kind. Last week the Pentagon disclosed that Defense Secretary Harold Brown would go to China at the end of the year to discuss mutual security problems.

News was also released of a Defense Department contingency study on the possible sale of weapons to China and the exchange of intelligence in the event of a war between the Soviet Union and the West. Moreover, although the U.S. announced that it was permitting the Soviets to buy a record amount of wheat and corn—25 million metric tons—in the coming year, the Defense Department blocked a sale of advanced computer technology to the U.S.S.R.

The White House actions, however, did not build any momentum behind SALT, whose prospects were set back by the flap over the brigade. Some previously uncommitted Senators seemed to move toward the opposition. Said Minority Leader Howard Baker, who has been against the treaty since June: "I'm afraid what Carter did was nothing at all. In this case, he stood toe to toe with the Soviet Union, and unlike 1962, we blinked."

Though Church claimed to be in favor of the treaty, he was drafting a reservation that would require the disbanding of the combat unit before the pact could go into effect. Complained Georgia Democrat Sam Nunn, an influential figure in the SALT debate: "The Soviet Union's mounting military activity in Cuba is the symptom, but Cuba's growing military activity in the Third World is the underlying disease."

Public reaction to Carter's disposal of the Cuban issue ranged from the mildly relieved to the immoderately outraged. Stormed the Dallas Morning News: "Frankly, we wonder if the American people aren't ready for Carter to get angry about something. Anything." On the other hand, the Boston Globe praised Carter for backing out of the Cuban impasse "with as much grace and political sure-footedness as was possible under the circumstances." Overseas, complaints about weak American leadership were mingled with gratitude that the conflict did not escalate. In a communique from Bonn, where they were meeting, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing urged that SALT be ratified "whatever other problems there may be on the international scene."

At week's end Secretary Vance indicated that through traditional diplomatic efforts, the U.S. had received more specific assurances from the Soviets about the brigade than Carter indicated. Going a bit further than any other U.S. spokesman had previously, Vance told TIME: "The Soviets have stated that Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and will not be a threat to the U.S. or any other nation The unit can do nothing more than conduct training functions. It will not be enlarged and it will not be given additional duties." If that is true, the issue should soon subside into the obscurity of the historical footnote that it probably deserves.