THE ADMINISTRATION: FORD'S COSTLY PURGE

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A concerned Gerald Ford met with some of his closest old friends and domestic advisers three weeks ago for a bare-knuckle assessment of what had gone wrong with his presidency. During the year of transition from the trauma of the Nixon Administration, his open and candid manner had calmed and reassured the nation. But then his fortunes had changed. His popularity fell to a low 47% in the Gallup poll late in October. His tireless campaigning for election drew yawns from even the party faithful. Ronald Reagan was challenging him on the right and moving up in the polls. More and more Americans were complaining that Ford's presidency lacked purpose and direction. Thus, at the private strategy session, recalled one adviser, "the President was urged to make everybody understand that he was definitely calling the shots."

Last week Ford tried to seize control of the situation with a barrage of firings and hirings such as the nation had not seen before, with the exception—in very different circumstances—of the Saturday Night Massacre by the desperate Nixon Administration in 1973 (see following story). For Ford, the moves backfired—at least initially. To many Americans, his actions seemed abrupt, not to say panicky. Instead of strength and certainty, he conveyed the impression that he was bumbling and dominated by political motives.

Ford insisted that he only wanted to field "my own team" in the crucial area of national security; he invoked the word team 16 times during a 33-minute televised press conference, four times in a single sentence. He exulted, "I did it totally on my own. It was my decision. I fitted the pieces together, and they fitted excellently ... These are my guys." Despite the Mr. Touchdown talk, the explanation did not score: the men who were benched had all served Ford ably. If his shuffling had been done only to put in more congenial and compliant subordinates, then it was even more unattractive and potentially dangerous.

Most of the criticism focused on the summary dismissal of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, an iconoclastic intellectual who says what he thinks —often in a prickly way. Was the reason for the firing his strong dissent from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's brand of détente? Or was it that Ford considered him overly acerbic, abrasive, aggressive? The answer, it seemed, was a combination of both, with the personal motive outweighing the policy problem. A President is certainly entitled to fire advisers with whom he cannot work. But a self-assured President should also be tolerant of dissent for the sake of keeping himself open to different points of view.

Ford's reasons for firing CIA Director William Colby were clearer. A fresh figure, preferably someone from outside the intelligence community, was needed to restore public confidence in the agency. Moreover, in the Administration's view, Colby had been too forthcoming in releasing secret information about the CIA's past misdeeds to the congressional investigating committees. But Ford's timing in dismissing Colby was odd indeed. Many political leaders wondered why the President had not waited until the investigations were over.